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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL EMULATION, THE EVOLUTION OF GENDER
NORMS, AND INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS: THREE
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
MAY 2013
SEUNG-YUN OH, B.S., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nancy Folbre
In this dissertation, I develop theoretical models and an empirical study of
the role of social interactions, the evolution of social norms, and their impact on
individual behavior. Although my models are consistent with individual utility
maximization, they generally emphasize social factors that channel individual deci-
sions and/or shape individuals’ preferences. I apply this approach to three different
issues: labor supply, fertility decisions, and intergenerational transfers, generating
predictions that are more consistent with observed empirical patterns of behav-
ior than standard neoclassical approaches that assume independent preferences,
perfect information, and efficient markets.
In the first essay, I explain the long-run evolution of working hours during
the 20th century in developed countries: the substantial decline for the first three
vi
quarters of the 20th century and the deceleration or even reversal of the fall in
working hours in the last quarter. I develop a model of the determination of working
hours and how this process is affected by both the conflict between employers and
employees and the employees’ desire to emulate the consumption standards of the
rich reference group. The model also explores the effects of direct and indirect
policies to limit hours advocated by political representations of workers such as
trade unions or leftist parties.
In the second essay, I study the coevolution of gender norms and fertility
regimes. Since the 1990s, a new pattern of positive correlation between fertility
rates and female labor force participation emerged in developed countries. This
recent trend seems inconsistent with conventional economic approaches that ex-
plain fertility decline as a result of the increasing opportunity costs of childrearing,
predicting a negative correlation between fertility and women’s labor force partici-
pation. To address this puzzle, I develop a model of the evolution of gender norms
and fertility in various economic environments influenced by the level of women’s
wages. Randomly matched spouses make choices related to fertility - labor supply
and the division of household labor - based on their preferences shaped by gender
norms. In the model, norm updating is influenced by both within-family payoffs
and conformism payoffs from social interactions among the same sex. The model
shows how changes in economic environments and the degree of conformism to-
ward norms can alter fertility outcomes. The results suggest that the asymmetric
evolution of gender norms between men and women could contribute to very low
fertility, explaining the positive correlation between fertility and women’s labor
force participation.
Finally, I estimate the effect of exogenously introduced public pensions for the
elderly on the amount of private transfers they receive. There has been a long
vii
debate whether public transfers crowd out private transfers. Previous empirical
studies on this issue suffer from the endogeneity of income that contaminates esti-
mates. I use an exogenously introduced public transfer, the Basic Old Age Pension
in Korea, to test the crowding out hypothesis. A considerable proportion of the
elderly population, especially women living without a spouse, do not experience
the crowding out effect and moreover, among those who do, the size of the effect is
relatively small. The results support the redistribution effect of the Basic Old Age
Pension targeting the poor elderly in Korea.
Key words: working hours, Veblen effect, labor discipline, fertility, gender
norms, conformism, intergenerational tranfsers, crowding out, public pensions
viii
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CHAPTER 1
SOCIAL EMULATION, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
AND THE DETERMINATION OF WORKING HOURS
1.1 Introduction
On the eve of the First World War, workers in ten major industrial economies1
spent, on average, a thousand hours more on the job a year than they did by the
end of the 20th century. The decline was greatest early in the century, then the
fall in working hours decelerated or even reversed in the last quarter of the 20th
century in some nations. Despite the country differences, long-run trends in all
countries are strikingly similar. The goal of this essay is to provide a model which
can explain the long-run evolution of working hours during the 20th century.
I develop a model of the determination of hours in paid employment and how
this process is affected by both the conflict between employers and employees and
the employees’ desire to emulate the consumption standards of the rich. In most
models of labor supply, employees choose their working hours. In contrast to the
standard labor supply models, I develop a labor discipline model in which hours
are determined by employers and subject to complete contracts, but employee work
1They are France, Germany, Netherland, Switzerland, U.K., Canada, U.S., Sweden, Australia,
and Japan. See Oh, Park, and Bowles (2012) for more detailed information.
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effort is not. I identify the conditions under which Veblen effects increase the hours
sought by employees, and under which the hours selected by profit-maximizing
employers will nonetheless exceed that preferred by employees.
Veblen pecuniary emulation effects occur in the model because even though the
hours of work is selected by the employer, the employees’ desire to emulate the
rich reference group increases their desired level of working hours. This, in turn,
influences the present value of the job at each level of hours chosen by the employer.
The result is an increase in the employer’s hours offer that minimizes the cost of
satisfying a no-shirking constraint.
The conflict over working hours occurs although the employer takes into account
the worker’s hours preferences. Profit maximization constrained by the employee’s
best (effort) response function entails under-providing the amenity - in this case the
workers’ optimal choice of hours (as in the case of other costly workplace amenities
(Bowles, 2004)). The firm’s profit-maximizing choice of hours and wages is thus
Pareto-inefficient, regardless of whether the workers would prefer fewer or more
hours than the firm selects.
When employers offer longer hours than the hours preferred by workers, trade
unions or political groups representing workers tend to advocate that government
limit working hours directly or indirectly. I also study the effect of governmental
interventions on equilibrium hours.
Other studies taking account of the fact that hours are chosen by employers, not
employees, have demonstrated that inefficiently long working hours may occur when
working time serves as a screening device for selecting workers with low disutility of
work (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995; Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor, 1996) or with high
productivity (Sousa-Posa and Ziegler, 2003). Others show that employees’ desired
and actual working hours may differ due to rising age-earning profiles adopted by
2
employers to reduce the incentive to shirk under mandatory retirement (Lazear,
1981; Lang, 1989). My model differs from these papers in that neither preference
heterogeneity nor screening plays a role in the model. Rather, working hours may
be either shorter or longer than employees prefer, the difference arising from the
fact that while working hours are subject to a complete contract, work itself is not
and the employer’s profit-maximizing labor discipline strategy is constrained by the
employees’ incentive compatibility constraint, not by the employees participation
constraint. The model is further developed and empirically tested using a century-
long data set for ten OECD countries in the related paper, Oh, Park, and Bowles
(2012).
In the next section I model the conflict over working hours, stipulating con-
ditions under which workers will prefer shorter hours than those selected by a
profit-maximizing employer. Section 3 describes conditions under which increases
in the incomes of the rich will increase equilibrium working hours. In section 4, I
study the effects of government interventions on working hours.
1.2 Conflict over Working Hours
1.2.1 Workers
Workers derive utilities from consumption and leisure, but experience disutil-
ity from exerting effort. When employed, a worker spends h hours working at a
wage rate w per hour, exerting per hour effort e. Individuals do not save, so the
individual’s own consumption is just income, wh. To model the effect of the conspic-
uous consumption of an individual’s top-income reference group, I define effective
consumption, x, as an individual’s own consumption level minus the invidious con-
3
sumption effect, namely a constant v (for V eblen) times the consumption level of
the reference group(cˆ); x = wh − vcˆ. This form captures the fact that invidious
comparisons with wealthier individuals both reduce one’s own utility and raise the
marginal utility of own consumption. I assume that the utility function is separable
and additive. The utility of effective consumption in a given time period takes the
following form;
C(x) =
1
1− ρ
(x1−ρ − 1),
where the parameter ρ measures the rate at which the marginal utility of effective
consumption diminishes. Workers’ utility of the leisure l is L(l), where l = 1 − h,
the time endowments are normalized to 1, and L is increasing and concave in its
argument. Workers’ disutility of work effort is increasing and convex in the total
effort expended, g(eh). I assume for simplicity that workers provide either e = 0
or e = 1. When employees shirk(e = 0), they do not experience disutility of work
effort, g(0) = 0. When unemployed, a worker receives an unemployment benefit, b,
so the effective consumption of the unemployed is b− vcˆ. The unemployed benefit
is less than the income of the employed, wh > b, over the relevant ranges of w
and h. Thus, I have following instantaneous utility functions for the non shirking
employees (UN), the shirking employees (US), and the unemployed (UU).
UN(w, h; cˆ) = C(wh− vcˆ) + L(1− h)− g(h)
US(w, h; cˆ) = C(wh− vcˆ) + L(1− h)
UU(cˆ) = C(b− vcˆ) + L(1)
The employee will choose not to shirk if the utility from shirking is no greater than
the utility from not shirking.
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I derive the no-shirking condition(NSC) following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
The present value of the job for an employed shirker (V N) , employed non-shirker
(V S), and the present value of the unemployed (V U) are
V N = UN +
qV U + (1− q)V N
1 + r
⇔ V N =
(1 + r)UN + qV U
r + q
(1.1)
V S = US +
(q + t)V U + (1− q − t)V S
1 + r
⇔ V S =
(1 + r)US + (q + t)V U
r + q + t
(1.2)
V U = UU +
λV + (1− λ)V U
1 + r
⇔ V U =
(1 + r)UU + λV
r + λ
(1.3)
where V is the expected utility of an employed worker, which equals V N at the
equilibrium. By solving (1.1) and (1.3), I get
r
1 + r
V U =
λUN + (r + q)UU
λ+ r + q
(1.4)
r
1 + r
V N =
(λ+ r)UN + qUU
λ+ r + q
(1.5)
The worker will choose not to shirk if V N ≥ V S. Substituting (1.3) into (1.1) and
(1.2), I get the no shirking condition,
UN − UU
r + λ+ q
≥
US − UN
t
, (1.6)
where UN − UU = C(wh− vcˆ) + L(1− h)− g(h)− C(b− vcˆ)− L(1); US − UN =
g(h); q is the probability of per period job separation either by exogenous factors
or retirement; λ is the per period job acquisition rate; and r denotes the per
period discount rate. Employers can detect and dismiss shirkers with termination
probability t, which is linear in working hours (t = τh), where τ is a positive
constant given by the nature of the production process. The left-hand side of (1.6)
is the present value of the job rent, that is, the benefit of not shirking; the right-
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hand side is the expected benefit of shirking, namely the per period utility gain from
shirking on the job multiplied by the expected duration of a shirker’s employment
(1
t
). Another expression of (1.6) in terms of per period job rent is
UN − UU ≥ (r + λ+ q)
US − UN
t
(1.7)
The right hand side of (1.7) is the minimum per period job rent sufficient to de-
ter shirking, which is the expected benefit of shirking (U
S−UN
t
) multiplied by the
discount factor. I call the right hand side of (1.7) simply the expected benefit of
shirking and denote it by η(h), i.e. η(h) := (r+λ+ q)g(h)
t(h)
, where g(h) = US −UN .
Solving (1.7) as an equality for the wage, I get the no-shirking wage as a function
of h and cˆ: w˜ = w˜(h, cˆ). I call w˜h the employer’s marginal wage cost of increasing
working hours.
1.2.2 The Firm
I assume that there is a large number of firms in the economy. An employer
varies working hours, the number of workers, and the wage rate to maximize profits
subject to a no shirking condition (NSC). Hiring shirking workers is not profitable
(output is zero when an individual shirks). Thus, the firm’s production function is
f(nh), where f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0. There is a positive employment cost (k) to employ
a worker, independent of the number of hours, which consists of search, training,
and related costs that do not vary with hours. Firm’s profit maximization problem
can be written as:
max
w,n,h
f(nh)− n(wh+ k)
s.t. w ≥ w˜(h)
6
Let (n∗, h∗) be the interior equilibrium that satisfies the following first order
conditions.
pin = h f
′ − (w˜h+ k) = 0
pih = n f
′ − n(w˜hh+ w˜) = 0
where pi(n, h) = f(nh) − n(w˜(h)h + k) and subscripts denote partial derivatives.
From these two first order conditions, I find
w˜hh =
k
h
(1.8)
The employer offers the equilibrium hours h∗ such that the marginal effect on the
wage bill of increasing hours (the left hand side of (1.8)) is equal to the average
(employment) cost per hour (the right hand side of (1.8)).
Figure 1 illustrates the profit-maximizing choice of working hours by the em-
ployer given by the tangency of the iso-profit locus to the no shirking condition.
I also see that when k = 0, the slope of the NSC and the slope of the iso-profit
function are zero, while they are positive when k > 0.
I now determine w˜h the marginal wage cost of increasing working hours (namely,
the slope of the NSC in Figure 1). By differentiating (1.7) with respect to h, I get
C ′(w˜ + hw˜h)− L
′ − g′ = η′ (1.9)
where η′(h) = ( r+λ+q
t
)(g′− t
′
t
g) is the marginal effect of an increase in hours on the
expected benefit of shirking (namely the increased marginal disutility of providing
effort minus the effect of greater hours on the probability of termination). The
7
Figure 1. The employer’s profit-maximizing choice of working hours
subject to the NSC. The slope of the tangent line between the NSC and
the iso-profit function is zero when k = 0 and positive when k > 0.
terms on the left hand side of (1.9) give the effects of an increase in working
hours on the per period job rent by raising income and so utilities of consumption
(C ′(w˜+hw˜h)), reducing worker’s leisure (−L
′), and increasing the disutility of effort
(−g′) respectively. By rearranging (1.9), I get the expression of w˜h as follows.
w˜h = −
w˜C ′ − L′ − g′
hC ′
+
η′
hC ′
(1.10)
The first term on the right hand side is the marginal rate of substitution between
hours and wages on the employees’ indifference locus (−
V N
h
V Nw
= − w˜C
′−L′−g′
hC′
). Note
that η′(h) in the second term is positive for all h because I have g′ > t
′
t
g = g
h
from the assumptions, t
′
t
= 1
h
and g(0) = 0, g′′ > 0. Therefore, the NSC is always
”steeper” than the employee’s indifference locus. Intuitively, the marginal effect on
no shirking wage of an increase in working hours (w˜h) will depend on two required
compensations: to make no-shirking workers indifferent (− w˜C
′−L′−g′
hC′
), and to offset
the induced incentive to shirk because of the prolonged working hours ( η
′
hC′
).
I now explore the conditions under which employees would prefer to work longer
8
or shorter hours than h∗.
1.2.3 Conflict over Working Hours
Employers have an interest in providing hours that employees prefer because by
doing so, they enhance the present value of the job rent and thereby reduce the no-
shirking wage. But here are two sources of conflict over working hours. To produce
the same output, shorter hours require paying the fixed employment cost (k) for
more employees, so the interests of the employer and employee are not perfectly
aligned when k > 0. Employer and employee interests diverge in a second way;
one that may offset the first. Variations in hours affect the expected benefits of
shirking (η′(h) in equation (1.10)). This effect is positive (the effect of greater hours
on the marginal disutility of not shirking exceeding the effect on the likelihood that
a shirker will be detected), so it provides a motive for the employer to offer fewer
hours than the employee would prefer. When expected-benefits-of-shirking effect
exceeds the employment-cost effect, workers will prefer more hours than employers
provide.
Since it is profitable for the employer to hire non-shirking employees, he offers
no-shirking wage and the employed workers will not shirk, so I derive workers’
optimal hours for non-shirking employees. Suppose that for some arbitrary wage,
workers were to choose working hours: they would maximize the present value of
the job, V N = (λ+r)U
N+qUU
r(λ+r+q)
, by choosing the optimal hours. Let ho = ho(w) be
the worker’s optimal working hours determined by equating the marginal utility of
the increased consumption made possible by greater hours to the disutility of lost
leisure and increased on the job effort, or
UNh (w, h
o(w)) = wC ′ − L′ − g′ = 0, for a given w (1.11)
9
It is easy to check that ho is a local maximum, satisfying the second order condition,
UNhh = (w
2C ′′ + L′′ − g′′) < 0, because C ′′ < 0, L′′ ≤ 0, and g′′ > 0. When UNh is
evaluated at the equilibrium (no shirking) wage and workers’ optimal hours, I have
UNh (w
∗, ho(w∗)) = 0. If I evaluate UNh at the equilibrium hours and wages (w
∗, h∗),
there are three possibilities: UNh (w
∗, h∗) < 0, UNh (w
∗, h∗) > 0, or UNh (w
∗, h∗) = 0.
The sign of UNh (w
∗, h∗) determines whether workers prefer longer (UNh (w
∗, h∗) > 0)
or shorter (UNh (w
∗, h∗) < 0) hours than h∗. If UNh (w
∗, h∗) < 0, then UNh (w
∗, h∗) <
UNh (w
∗, ho(w∗)) = 0, thus, workers will prefer shorter hours than the equilibrium
hours, h∗ > ho, because the marginal utility is decreasing in h (UNhh < 0) given a
wage.
I now show that whether the workers’ optimal working hours are equal to,
shorter, or longer than that the employer offers will be determined by the size of
the fixed employment cost, k, and the size of the effect of hours on the expected
benefits of shirking (η′(h)). By substituting (1.10) into (1.8), I get the employer’s
equilibrium condition from which h∗ is determined:
k = h2w˜h = −
h
C ′
(w˜C ′ − L′ − g′) +
h
C ′
η′︸︷︷︸
(+)
(1.12)
If I evaluate the term (w˜C ′−L′−g′) at the equilibrium hours and wage (h∗, w∗), it is
the same as UNh (w
∗, h∗). When k = 0, the term should be positive because η′(h) > 0
for all h. Then the marginal rate of substitution of between hours and wages on
the employees’ indifference locus (− w˜C
′−L′−g′
hC′
) will be negative at (h∗, w∗). Panel
A in Figure 2 shows workers’ indifference loci V¯ N that go through (w∗, ho(w∗)) and
(w∗, h∗) when k = 0. The slope of V¯ N at workers’ optimal hours is zero, while it is
negative at the equilibrium. Thus, the workers’ optimal hours are longer than h∗.
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Panel B shows the case of positive k. If k = h
C′
η′ at the equilibrium, then from
(1.12), (w˜C ′ − L′ − g′) will be zero, so workers’ optimal hours and the equilibrium
hours at the wage w∗ will coincide. I denote ko the corresponding fixed cost. Finally,
if k > h
C′
η′, the term (w˜C ′−L′−g′) will be negative (UNh (w
∗, h∗) < 0), so the slope
of V¯ N at the equilibrium is positive. This implies workers prefer shorter hours
than h∗, as shown in Panel C in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Optimal hours for employers and employees for various k
The economic intuition is the following. The difference between workers’ and
11
employer’s optimal choices of h comes from the employment cost and the effect of
h on the benefit of shirking, η′(h). If there is no employment cost, the fact that
an increase in h raises the benefit of shirking and therefore requires a higher no
shirking wage will induce the employer to offer shorter working hours than workers
prefer (Panel A in Figure 2). However, if the employment cost is greater than the
effect on the benefit of shirking it will be profitable for the employer to hire fewer
workers with longer hours than the hours preferred by employees at the no shirking
wage. I record this observation as Proposition 1.2.1.
Proposition 1.2.1 (Conflict over hours) If k > h
∗
C′
η′ (k < h
∗
C′
η′) at the equilib-
rium, the employer selects longer (shorter) working hours than workers prefer.
It is noteworthy that the equilibrium hours of work and wage will be Pareto
inefficient even in the case (Panel B in Figure 2) where there is no conflict over
working hours. This result follows directly from the fact that the employer max-
imizes profits subject to the no shirking condition – an incentive compatibility
constraint based on the employee’s best response – rather than the employee’s par-
ticipation constraint. The economic intuition is clear from Panel B in Figure 2,
where the shaded lens indicates the set of Pareto improvements over {h∗, w∗}. Here
I illustrate Pareto inefficiency. Let (w, h) = (h∗+∆h, w∗+∆w) be a pair of wages
and hours near the equilibrium (h∗, w∗) with sufficiently small (∆h,∆w) such that
−
V N
h
V Nw
(h∗, w∗) < ∆w
∆h
< w˜h(h
∗), then both workers and the employer can be better
off by the small increases in h and w.
12
First, I evaluate V N at (h∗ +∆h, w∗ +∆w), then
V N(h∗ +∆h, w∗ +∆w) ' V N(h∗, w∗) + V Nw ∆w + V
N
h ∆h
> V N(h∗, w∗) + V Nw (−
V Nh
V Nw
∆h) + V Nh ∆h
= V N(h∗, w∗)
Second, I evaluate the iso-profit function, p¯i(n, h, w) = f(nh)−n(wh+k) at (n∗, h∗+
∆h, w∗ +∆w), then I have
p¯i(n∗, h∗ +∆h, w∗ +∆w) ' p¯i(n∗, h∗, w∗) + p¯iw∆w + p¯ih∆h
> p¯i(n∗, h∗, w∗) + p¯iw∆w + p¯ih
∆w
w˜h
= p¯i(n∗, h∗, w∗) + (p¯iww˜h + p¯ih)
∆w
w˜h
= p¯i(n∗, h∗, w∗)
The last equality holds because from the employer’s first order condition I have
pih(n
∗, h∗) = p¯iww˜h + p¯ih = 0. Thus, both workers and the employer are better off.
Implementation of the increase in wages and hours that would carry out the
Pareto improvements as a Nash equilibrium, however, is impossible, because the
small change in (∆h,∆w) satisfying ∆w
∆h
< w˜h(h
∗) violates the NSC.
1.3 The Veblen Effect
The conflict over working hours (Proposition 1.2.1) occurs because on the mar-
gin the firm evaluates the hours-wages trade off differently from workers. By con-
trast, the Veblen effect on working hours occurs because the firm responds to the
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change in workers’ preferences that result from an increase in consumption by a
rich reference group (cˆ), which alters the workers’ wages-hours trade off, inducing
them to prefer more hours. To see this I begin with the effect of cˆ on worker’s
optimal working hours from (1.11):
hocˆ =
wvC ′′
w2C ′′ + L′′ − g′′
> 0
Thus, the increase in the consumption of the top reference group induces workers to
desire longer working hours. Now I perform the comparative statics of the changes
in cˆ on the equilibrium working hours, which I call Veblen effect. No shirking wage
is now a function of h and cˆ; w˜ = w˜(h, cˆ). Applying Cramer’s rule and the implicit
function theorem, I get
dh∗
dcˆ
=
pinhpincˆ − pinnpihcˆ
|H|
(1.13)
dn∗
dcˆ
=
pinhpihcˆ − pihhpincˆ
|H|
(1.14)
where |H| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix. The Hessian matrix is given
as:
H =

 pinn pinh
pihn pihh


where the second derivatives are
pinn = f
′′h2
pinh = f
′′nh+ f ′ − (w˜ + hw˜h) = f
′′nh (1.15)
pihh = f
′′n2 − n(2w˜h + h w˜hh)
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The second equation in (1.15) holds because pih = f
′n−n(w˜+hw˜h) = 0. For h
∗ to
be the strict maximum of the profit function, the Hessian matrix must be negative
definite. I have pinn < 0, and |H| is
|H| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pinn pinh
pihn pihh
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = pinnpihh − pi
2
nh > 0
= −f ′′nh2(2w˜h + h w˜hh)
Since f ′′ < 0, the sufficient condition for the maximum is 2w˜h + h w˜hh > 0. I have
pincˆ = −hw˜cˆ
pihcˆ = −n(w˜cˆ + hw˜hcˆ)
Thus, from (1.15) and (1.13), the effect of an increase in cˆ on the equilibrium h∗ is
dh∗
dcˆ
=
−f ′′nh2w˜cˆ + f
′′nh2(w˜cˆ + hw˜hcˆ)
|H|
=
f ′′nh3w˜hcˆ
|H|
(1.16)
where the denominator, |H| = −f ′′nh2(2w˜h + h w˜hh), is positive for a maximum
profit.
Before I find w˜hcˆ, I need to calculate w˜cˆ. From the NSC, I get
w˜cˆ =
v
hC ′
(C ′ − C ′U) < 0 (1.17)
where C ′U is the unemployed workers’ marginal utility of consumption evaluated at
b−vc˜; i.e. C ′U = C
′(b−vcˆ). I have w˜cˆ < 0, because the marginal utility of effective
consumption of the unemployed is greater than that of the employed (C ′ < C ′U
because wh− vc˜ > b− vc˜ and C ′′ < 0), so the increase in cˆ raises the value of the
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employment rent (UN − UU), while the increase in cˆ has no effect on the expected
benefit of shirking (η(h)). Thus, the employer can induce effort with a lower wage
than before.
I then find whcˆ using (1.10) and (1.17):
w˜hcˆ = −
C ′′(h w˜cˆ − v)
hC ′2
{−(w˜C ′ − L′ − g
′
) + η′}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
−
1
hC ′
{w˜cˆC
′ + w˜C ′′(h w˜cˆ − v)}
(1.18)
Proposition 1.3.1 provides an intuitive sufficient condition under which the increase
in the consumption of the top reference group lowers the marginal wage cost of
increasing working hours, so the employer offers longer working hours.
Proposition 1.3.1 (Veblen effect) If ρ > w
∗h∗−vcˆ
w∗h∗
, then the increase in cˆ raises
the equilibrium working hours.
Proof. From the assumption, I have
−
C ′′
C ′
(w∗h∗ − vcˆ) = ρ >
w∗h∗ − vcˆ
w∗h∗
Then C ′ + w∗h∗C ′′ < 0, and (C ′ + w∗h∗C ′′)w˜cˆ − vw
∗C ′′ > 0, so the second term
in (1.18) is negative. I know that the term −(w˜C ′ − L′ − g
′
) + η′ is positive from
(1.10) because I have w˜h > 0. So, the first term on the right hand side of (1.18)
is negative because C ′′ < 0 and w˜cˆ < 0. Therefore, I have w˜hcˆ < 0, and I conclude
dh∗
dcˆ
> 0 from equation (1.16)
I illustrate the Veblen effect in Figure 3. For any given h, an increase in the
income of the top reference group lowers the no-shirking wage (w˜cˆ < 0) and lowers
the cost of increasing hours (w˜hcˆ < 0), which rotates the w˜(h, cˆ1) clockwise to
w˜(h, cˆ2). Thus, equilibrium working hours are longer.
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Figure 3. The Veblen effect (increase in cˆ) This figure illustrates the effect of
an increase in cˆ (cˆ1 < cˆ2) on the equilibrium working hours. The equilibrium
h∗
1
and h∗
2
correspond to cˆ1 and cˆ2 respectively.
Intuitively, if the increase in cˆ lowers w˜h (the marginal cost of increasing h),
then given the concavity of the production function, the firm in response will raise
working hours to satisfy the first order condition. This gives us the Veblen effect.
The increase in cˆ lowers w˜h because i) it lowers effective consumption, and so
raises C ′ since I have C ′′ < 0, ii) raises the job rent, so the firm can lower the
wage, which I already showed, namely w˜cˆ < 0. However, the increase in cˆ also
has an offsetting effect on w˜h because the lowered wage weakens the income effect
of h that enables the employer to reduce the no-shirking wage. The first effect
inducing the employer to offer longer working hours will dominate the second effect
if workers’ C ′′ is large relative to C ′ in absolute value. Note that the condition
ρ > w
∗h∗−vcˆ
w∗h∗
does not require an implausible level of concavity of the workers’
utility function; a logarithmic function (ρ→ 1) satisfies the condition for example,
and for a substantial Veblen effect considerably less concave functions do as well.
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1.4 Policies to Limit Working Hours
The working hours observed in any economy are determined in part by the
competitive and non-cooperative interactions of workers and employers, as I have
modeled them above. But working hours are typically also influenced by collec-
tive action by workers, their employers and governments. If employers offer longer
hours than the working hours desired by employees, trade unions and political par-
ties representing workers may advocate government interventions to reduce working
hours. I consider two kinds of interventions: direct interventions, in which a na-
tional trade union or the government simply imposes the maximum working time;
and indirect interventions, in which the government adopts policies to affect the
employers’ choice of working hours.
1.4.1 Direct Limits on Working Hours
Political representation of workers may advocate government interventions to
impose maximum working hours, preserving the equilibrium wage and compensat-
ing the profit loss by reducing the fixed cost of employment with subsidy. The
direct intervention of legal hours restriction is a long-run policy, so I consider it in
a general equilibrium model. Suppose a general equilibrium (h∗, n∗, w∗, λ∗) in which
the employer chooses h, n, w given fixed cost of employment k, and workers prefer
shorter hours than offered by the employer given the equilibrium wage.
In a general equilibrium the job acquisition rate is endogenously determined,
so I first endogenize λ. Let N be the total number of workers (both employed and
unemployed), and m be aggregate employment, which is m = Mn, where M is
the number of firms and n is the number of employees of each identical firm. The
number of firms will be determined by the zero profit condition (ZPC). In a steady
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state the flow into the unemployment pool is equal to the flow out, qm = λ(N−m),
so λ = qm
N−m
. Now the NSC has two endogenous variables, h and λ.
UN − UU ≥ (r + λ+ q)
US − UN
t
⇔ w ≥ wˆ(h, λ)
I have wˆλ =
1
hC′
g
t
> 0, and dλ
dm
> 0, so the increase in aggregate employment raises
the no shirking wage, wˆm = wˆλ
dλ
dm
> 0.
Unlike individual workers, who take the wage as given and just think about
whether fewer or more hours at that wage would be nice, I assume that the union
knows that i) the job acquisition rate λ is influenced by the total number of em-
ployees, and ii) the no shirking wage is affected by h and λ. The union cares about
both employed and unemployed workers, so I derive the union’s utility, denoted by
V T , as the normalized sum of all workers’ utilities:
V T =
m
N
V N +
N −m
N
V U
where m
N
is the ratio of employed to total workers. Trade unions may value expand-
ing employment more highly than this “sum of worker utility” approach possibly
because they would like to increase membership or have pro-poor distributional
values (Alesina, Algan, Cahuc, and Giuliano, 2010). But I adopt this formulation
here for simplicity, and because it could arguably be the objective function of a so-
cial planner maximizing social welfare. From the equation λ = qm
N−m
, I get m
N
= λ
λ+q
and N−m
N
= q
λ+q
, I can simplify V T further as follows:
V T =
1 + r
r
λUN + qUU
λ+ q
The job acquisition rate positively affects the union’s utility, V Tλ =
1+r
r
q(UN−UU )
(λ+q)2
>
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0, so the union prefers high aggregate employment, V Tm = V
T
λ
dλ
dm
> 0. Note that
the job acquisition rate negatively affects the employer’s profit, piλ = −nhwˆλ < 0,
which implies pim < 0. Thus, I can verify that the union and the employer are at
conflict over aggregate employment.
Denote the maximum hour limit by hˆ(< h∗) and the reduced fixed cost of
employment which guarantees restoring the ZPC by kˆ. The employer will choose
maximum hours hˆ because pih|h<h∗ > 0, and the optimal number of workers by
solving (1.19) given the fixed cost of employment, and government finally chooses
kˆ from the ZPC. The new set of values (hˆ, nˆ, w∗, kˆ) satisfies the following two
equations:
pin = hˆf
′ − {w∗hˆ+ kˆ} = 0 (1.19)
f(n∗h∗)− n∗(w∗h∗ + k) = f(nˆhˆ)− n¯(w∗hˆ+ kˆ) (1.20)
Note that the number of firms M does not change because the profits are restored;
thus, if I have nˆ > n∗, then the job acquisition rate corresponding to hˆ is higher
than before (λˆ > λ∗).
To determine the effect of the reduction in hours on the number of workers hired
by a firm, I differentiate the firm’s first order condition with respect to h given the
wage (w∗) and the fixed cost (k):
dn
dh
= −
n
h
−
f ′ − wˆ − hwˆh
h2f ′′
(1.21)
The first term on the right hand side of (1.21) is the substitution effect: to produce
the same amount as before with fewer hours the firm needs more workers (this is
substitution along a given iso-quant). The second term is offsetting the substitution
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effect because the firm may produce less output due to the reduced profit by the
reduction in h. Since f ′ − w = k
h
> 0 for any positive k, I need the condition,
f ′ + nhf ′′ < w∗ to have dn
dh
< 0. Let f(x) = xβ, 0 < β < 1, be the production
function (or revenue). Then the condition for dn
dh
< 0 is β < w
∗
f ′(nh)
. Note that the
condition can be expressed as β2(nh)β−1 < w∗, and the term β2(nh)β−1 is increasing
in β, so the employer hires more workers in response to the restriction on working
hours, if the production function is sufficiently concave (low β). Thus, given the
equilibrium wage and the fixed cost, the reduction in hours will lower the profit, and
the firm will hire more workers if the production function is sufficiently concave. If
government compensates firms by lowering the fixed cost of employment to restore
the profit as the same as previous equilibrium, then the number of workers of each
firm will be even larger.
Proposition 1.4.1 In a competitive market equilibrium in which employees prefer
shorter working hours than offered by employers, the policy imposing the maxi-
mum hours accompanied with preserved wage and compensation on the profit loss
by reducing the fixed cost of employment makes the union better off while leaving
employers indifferent, if the production function is sufficiently concave such that
β < w
∗
f ′(nˆhˆ)
at the new policy equilibrium.
Proof. Since the ZPC holds for both cases, employers are indifferent under the
policy. I compare union’s utilities under the two equilibria. From the condition
β < w
∗
f ′(nˆhˆ)
, I know that nˆ > n∗ and λˆ > λ∗. Since the equilibrium wage is the
same, I rewrite union’s utility as follows;
V T (h, λ) =
1 + r
r
{
λ
λ+ q
UN(w∗, h) +
q
λ+ q
UU}
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I know that V Tλ > 0, and V
T
h
∣∣
(w∗,h∗)
= 1+r
r
λ
λ+q
dUN
dh
< 0 because dU
N
dh
(w∗, h∗) < 0.
The maximum hours hˆ shorter than h∗ (but no shorter than individual workers’
optimal) will increase union’s utility. The union is better off in the new equilibrium
than the laissez-faire one: V T (hˆ, λˆ) > V T (h∗, λ∗).
1.4.2 Indirect Policies to Limit Working Hours
Other policies may affect working hours by altering the conditions under which
the employer chooses working hours. I introduce two policies: an employment
subsidy that lowers the fixed cost of hiring; an increase in the unemployment benefit
which raises workers’ fallback and no shirking wage. I assume that these are short-
run policies so I consider λ an exogenous variable and I do not study financing
these programs.
First, I consider the employment subsidy policy whereby the firm receives an
amount s > 0 for each employee. The employer’s profit maximization problem
becomes:
max
w,n,h
pi = f(nh)− n(wh+ k − s)
s.t. w ≥ w˜(h)
From the two first order conditions, I get the equilibrium condition analogous to
(1.8):
w˜hh =
k − s
h
(1.22)
The result is clear if I compare (1.8) and (1.22). The employment subsidy lowers
the marginal cost of employment and raises the relative cost of increasing working
hours, as a result, the employer will offer shorter working hours.
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Second, I study the effect of an increase in unemployment benefit. Now the
no-shirking wage is a function of h and b, w˜ = w˜(h, b). Using the result of (1.16),
I have
dh∗
db
=
f ′′nh3w˜hb
|H|
(1.23)
By differentiating the NSC and w˜h with respect to b, I get
w˜b =
C ′U
hC ′
> 0 (1.24)
w˜hb(h, b) = −
C ′′w˜b
C ′2
{−(w˜C ′ − L′ − g
′
) + η′}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
−
wˆb
hC ′
(C ′ + whC ′′) (1.25)
An increase in unemployment benefits will (under the stated conditions) decrease
the job rent (equation (1.24)), and raise the cost of increasing hours of work (equa-
tion (1.25)), so the employer offers shorter working hours. This result is the opposite
of the displacement of the NSC shown in Figure 3. An increase in the unemploy-
ment benefit shifts up the NSC because the job rent decreases, so the employer
needs to pay a higher no-shirking wage. In addition, it also increases the slope
of the no shirking wage function, as a result, it reduces the equilibrium hours.
Proposition 1.4.2 summarizes the effects of both policies.
Proposition 1.4.2 (Public policy effects) Equilibrium working hours are re-
duced by the following policies:
i) an employment subsidy
ii) an increase in unemployment benefit conditional on ρ > w
∗h∗−vcˆ
w∗h∗
Proof. i) Employment subsidy
Let (n∗, h∗) be the interior equilibrium and it satisfies the following first order
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conditions
pin = f
′h− (w˜h+ (k − s)) = 0
pih = f
′n− n(w˜ + h w˜h) = 0
The second derivatives are
pihs = 0, pins = 1
Again from (1.15) and (1.13) I have
dh∗
ds
=
f ′′nh
|H|
< 0
ii) Unemployment benefit
Since w˜b > 0, C
′′ < 0, and −(w˜C ′ − L′ − g
′
) + η′ > 0, the first term in (1.25) is
positive. I have C ′ + w∗h∗C ′′ < 0 for ρ > w
∗h∗−vcˆ
w∗h∗
, then the second term of (1.25)
is also positive, therefore w˜hb(h
∗, b) > 0. From (1.23) I have dh
∗
db
< 0.
1.5 Conclusion
I have provided a new model of equilibrium working hours selected by a profit-
maximizing employer who also selects a wage rate to satisfy a no-shirking condition.
Unlike the standard model of labor supply in which employees face a parametric
wage and trades-off between leisure and goods to maximize utility, here the em-
ployees’ leisure-labor trade-offs affect hours indirectly by altering the cost to the
employer of satisfying a labor discipline condition necessitated by the incomplete
nature of the employment contract.
In addition to institutional realism – the employer, not the worker, chooses the
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hours offer – there are attractive features to the model. First, by embedding it in
a principal agent model, I extend the analysis of the comparison-based utility that
produces Veblen effects when employees seek to emulate the consumption standards
of the rich. Second, I provide a model – the first to my knowledge – of one of the
most important social conflicts from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution
until the Great Depression: the opposing interests of workers and their employers
concerning the length of the working day. Third, I identify conditions in this setting
under which employees would prefer to work longer (as well as less) than the hours
selected by the employer. Fourth, I show that improvements in the employees’
fallback position, which occurred in part through the expansion of the welfare state
in the countries under study, will reduce equilibrium working hours. Finally and
perhaps surprisingly, I can show that the equilibrium hours resulting from the
interaction of the profit-maximizing employer and the utility maximizing employee
are Pareto inefficient even if the equilibrium hours selected by the employer do not
differ from those that maximize the present value of employee utility.
The results of the model are consistent with the following explanation of the
deceleration or even reversal of the fall in working hours during the last quarter
of the past century. As equilibrium hours approached those preferred by workers,
further reductions in working hours dropped in importance on the agendas of the
organizations and parties representing workers; moreover, the increase in top in-
come shares (in some countries) led employees to place a higher value on longer
hours.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLUTION OF GENDER NORMS, DIVISION OF
LABOR AND FERTILITY
2.1 Introduction
During the 20th century the total fertility rate declined substantially in many
countries as women’s participation in the labor force increased. In the final decades
of that century, however, fertility trends stabilized in some countries, revealing a
new pattern of positive correlation between fertility and female labor force partic-
ipation. Israel, Sweden, the U.S., and Norway, countries with relatively high levels
of female participation in paid employment also have relatively high fertility rates
(at or slightly above replacement levels). By contrast, Japan, Spain, and Italy with
relatively low levels of female participation, have relatively low fertility rates (well
below replacement levels) (Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Dora, 2008). This recent trend
seems inconsistent with conventional economic approaches (Mincer, 1963; Becker,
1965; Willis, 1973) that explain fertility decline as a result of increasing opportu-
nity costs of childrearing, predicting a negative correlation between fertility and
women’s labor force participation.
Fertility rates have declined particularly rapidly in Asia, from 5.3 children per
woman in the late 1960s to 1.6 now. In Asian countries with the lowest marriage
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rates, the fertility rate is even lower, close to 1.0 (The Economist, August 2011).
Below-replacement fertility rates result from both low marital fertility and non-
marriage and/or delayed marriage. Strong traditional gender roles in those coun-
tries make it difficult for married women to both engage in paid employment and
fulfill responsibilities for family care. Yet, despite low levels of paid employment,
married women seem reluctant to have large numbers of children.
In this essay I suggest that the asymmetric evolution of gender norms between
men and women could contribute to very low fertility, providing an explanation for
the positive relation between fertility and women’s labor force participation. I con-
sider two gender norms: a traditional “separate spheres” norm and an egalitarian
“shared care” norm. The “separate spheres” norm dictates traditional gender roles
in which men specialize in both wage employment and the public sphere whereas
women specialize in family care and the private sphere. The “shared care” norm
allows women to engage in market work, with men and women sharing the cost of
household labor and childrearing.
In a standard model of the marriage market, potential spouses try to find the
best possible match. But this does not necessarily imply that they are able to find
matches with spouses who share norms and preferences regarding the division of
labor. Unlike other factors determining sorting in the marriage market - such as
wealth, education, and outward appearance - potential partners may be unable to
accurately observe one another’s norms, which are easily misrepresented. In addi-
tion, if gender norms evolve asymmetrically between men and women - for example,
most men conform to traditional gender norms, while most women conform to more
egalitarian norms – it could be hard to find a partner who shares the same norms.
A person could decide to marry someone with different norms because it is better
than not marrying at all. Non-marriage can also be viewed as a possible outcome
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of the mismatched norm problem.
My approach differs from traditional economic theories of marriage in two ways.
First, in contrast to Beckerian models, in which perfect specialization between men
and women - corresponding to separate spheres norm - is considered efficient, I
assume that marriage based on shared care norms can be more efficient in certain
environments because diversification provides insurance against unemployment and
strengthens paternal ties to children. Second, in contrast with the Coase Theo-
rem, which assumes individuals can always implement efficient solutions through
bargaining over redistribution, I emphasize bargaining rigidities that can lead to
inefficient outcomes such as couples with mismatched preferences or a tendency to
decline marriage.
I develop a model of the evolution of gender norms and fertility decisions in an
asymmetric two-population game using evolutionary game theory. In the model,
spouses are randomly matched regarding their norms. I refer to gender norms that
have been “internalized” and have become in a sense a “preference”. I define gender
norms as informal governing rules that specify the division of labor: men decide
whether to provide help on childrearing, while women decide whether to engage in
market work. Fertility results from the choices that spouses make. If both husband
and wife adhere to a separate spheres norm, then the wife will stay at home and
tend to have high fertility. If both adhere to a shared care norm, the wife is likely
to work and the husband provides help with childrearing. Her fertility will be lower
than in the first case, due to the opportunity costs of childrearing, but intermediate
levels will still be achieved. Among couples with mismatched norms, especially if
husbands adhere to separate spheres norms but their wives have shared care norms,
couples tend to have low fertility due to possible conflict over child care. Wives
are likely to work whereas husbands do not provide help with childrearing. In
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this case wives will respond by lowering their fertility far below replacement levels
because they are likely to suffer from ”dual burden”. If husbands adhere to shared
care norms but their wives adhere to separate sphere norms, conflict could also
arise over the wives’ foregone market income (the husbands may want wives to
contribute to the household with market income, while they themselves are willing
to work fewer hours to be fathers). However, the conflict over child care, which is
crucial in determining fertility, would be far less than with the other mismatched
couples.
In the model, I consider women’s market wage as an important economic fac-
tor that influences women’s time allocation between market work and household
work. Here women’s market wage is considered as an expected wage which is deter-
mined by both women’s wage level and job opportunity because high wages do not
necessarily go along with high female employment. In developed countries where
women’s wages and opportunities for paid employment are sufficiently high, women
adhering to shared care norms will have higher payoffs than women residing in less
developed countries.
Individuals have a tendency to adopt a particular behavior prevalent in the
population (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Bowles, 2004). Boyd and Richerson (1985)
define conformist transmission as a tendency to copy the most frequent behavior
in the population. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argue that violating a society’s be-
havioral prescriptions evokes utility loss such as anxiety and discomfort. Similarly,
the formation of an individual’s gender norm is influenced by other agents’ norms,
especially those of the same sex. Most studies on norm evolution consider norms as
average behavior and the conformist payoff is modeled as utility gain depending on
how close their action approximates the social norm. Thus, the conformist payoffs
depend on the frequency of agents adopting the behavior. However, specifying the
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frequency of norms is insufficient to explain the transition of norms - the intensity of
norms also matters. Even though the traditional “separate spheres” gender norm
has weakened over time in many societies, including the U.S., it remains firmly
entrenched in East Asian countries, especially Japan and South Korea. Thus, I
consider the degree of conformity, which captures the extent to which individuals
in a society attach themselves to a norm. The greater a society’s conformity toward
existing norms, the greater the resistance to a transition to new norms.
Gender norms concerning division of labor are readily tested empirically. The
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Family and Changing Gender Roles
survey includes specific questions on gender roles such as “A man’s job is to earn
money, a woman’s job is to look after the home and family”, and “What most
women really want is a home and children”. Analyzing such data, several recent
studies attempt to explain international differences in fertility rates by investigating
the relationships among gender inequality, the division of household labor, women’s
labor supply and fertility decisions. Using the ISSP Family and Changing Gender
Roles survey, Laat and Sanz (2006) distinguish gender attitudes within households
from average attitudes of a society. They show that households with less egalitarian
attitudes tend to have more children in a country; however, countries with less
egalitarian views tend to have low fertility because the average attitude plays a role
as social externality. Using the same data, Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Dora (2008) also
find a positive relation between men’s household work and the total fertility rate,
and between government family subsidies and fertility. Mills, Mencarini, Tanturri,
and Begall (2008) compare gender equity and fertility decisions between Italy and
Netherlands. They find that an unequal division of household labor is significantly
associated with women’s fertility intentions when those women already suffer from
a “dual burden” or “second shift”. This literature, however, does not explicitly
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explore the effect of asymmetric gender norms on fertility decisions.
Evolutionary approaches to family have mainly dealt with issues such as the
degree of altruism corresponding to biological relatedness (Hamilton, 1964); parent-
offspring conflict (Trivers, 1974); sibling rivalry; gender differences in reproductive
cost which implies a conflict over quality/quantity trade-offs between males and
females (Folbre, 2006); and son preferences (Edlund, 1999). However, few studies to
date have paid attention to the evolution of gender norms. Iversen and Rosenbluth
(2006) describe how different modes of production affect inter-gender bargaining
power and the evolution of social norms, arguing that patriarchal social norms are
the result of bargaining dynamics in labor-intensive agricultural societies. Some
previous studies show the differences between patriarchal and egalitarian family
contracts (Braunstein and Folbre, 2001; Geddes and Lueck, 2002; Folbre, 2006). By
adding the insight that norms are internalized preferences that influence fertility
decisions, this paper builds on existing studies by providing a formal model of the
evolution of gender norms and emphasizing in particular the role of conformism.
To examine the evolutionary process of changes in gender norms, I employ
evolutionary game theory in which norm updating is determined partly by the
within-family payoffs based on each spouse’s norm, and partly by the influence of
social interactions among the same sex. First, I find evolutionary stable strate-
gies of gender norms and corresponding fertility equilibrium in various economic
environments. Then I examine how conformism alters the equilibrium. Second, I
employ a stochastic evolutionary model to study equilibrium selection in the long-
run. In contrast to static and deterministic evolutionary games, stochastic games
have an advantage in selecting equilibrium. The model extends existing stochastic
evolutionary game theory in that it studies joint dynamics of between groups and
within group interactions for asymmetric two-population games.
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Section 2 provides the main model. In section 3 I apply the result of the model
to fertility decisions. In section 4 I study equilibrium selection in the long run.
Concluding remarks follow.
2.2 The Model
Suppose a society consists of N males and N females. For simplicity, I assume a
constant gender ratio. There are two types of gender norms regarding the division
of labor within family: a traditional separate spheres norm denoted by T and
an egalitarian shared care norm by E. Each individual is endowed with a norm
before marriage. When a male and a female are matched into a family, they choose
strategies about how to divide household work and market work. A husband has
two choices whether to share childrearing work: {Not Help (NH), Help (H)}. A
wife also has two choices whether to engage in market work: {Not Work(NW ),
Work(W )}. The choices are made corresponding to their norms: a husband with
T norm will not help, while a husband with E norm will help; a wife with T norm
will not work, while a wife with E norm will work.
Each individual has identical preferences about the number of children and
consumption. The utility of having children is simply the number of children,
n, which is determined by joint decision of husband and wife; it is a function
of a couple’s time spent on childrearing. Let tm and tf be the time devoted to
childrearing and the fertility function is given as n(tm, tf ), where n is increasing
in both arguments. For simplicity I disregard financial costs of raising children.
I assume all income is spent, so the consumption of an individual is simply the
income of the individual. All husbands work outside and earn the same income.
If a husband chooses to help on childrearing, he pays the cost of help, denoted by
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g > 0, which can be regarded as foregone leisure time. Wives are endowed with
time=1 and allocate their time between childrearing (tf = h) and market work
(1− h).
I assume random matching and there are four possible outcomes. When both
spouses have T norm, the wife will stay at home spending her entire time on chil-
drearing, so they will have high fertility. When a male with T norm is matched
by a female with E norm, the wife will engage in market work, splitting her time
between market work and childrearing, while the husband will not help with chil-
drearing, so the fertility will be the lowest. When both spouses have E norm, the
wife will work outside but the husband provides help with childrearing, so they will
have intermediate level fertility. Finally, when a male with E norm is matched by
a female with T norm - the wife will stay at home and the husband is willing to
help - their fertility will be high. By letting nH := n(g, 1) = n(0, 1), nM := n(g, h),
and nL := n(0, h), where nH > nM > nL, the fertility results corresponding to four
matching outcomes are given as:
(T, T ) ⇔ (NH, NW ) : nH
(E, T ) ⇔ (H,NW ) : nH
(E,E) ⇔ (H, NW ) : nM
(T,E) ⇔ (NH, W ) : nL
I assume that husband’s earning (I) is the same for any family and is shared by
his family members, so I simply subtract the husband’s income from all payoffs. A
wife’s earning can also be shared by her husband, but I disregard the husband’s
benefit from the wife’s wages because it does not alter the husband’s choice; given a
wife’s choice of work, a husband will receive the same benefit from whatever choices
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he makes. The underlying payoffs of all outcomes are given as follows:
Male
Female
Not Work Work
Not Help (nH , nH) (nL, nL + w)
Help (nH − g, nH) (nM − g, nM + w)
Without loss of generality, I assume that nH = 3n, nM = 2n, nL = n. Thus, the
within-family payoffs become
Male
Female
Not Work Work
Not Help (3n, 3n) (n, n+ w)
Help (3n− g, 3n) (2n− g, 2n+ w)
(2.1)
It is assumed that having children is desirable and worth the cost for husbands:
n > g.
I denote the population fraction of T norm in a male population by x and the
fraction of T norm in a female population by y. Let s = (x, y) be the population
state of norms. The set of all s = (x, y) is
S = {(x, y); x =
i
N
, y =
j
N
, for i, j = 0, 1, ..., N} (2.2)
The utility (U) of an agent is the sum of two payoffs: a payoff from a family (piW ),
and a payoff from social interactions (piB). Let the within-family payoff of player i
with a norm k in a population state of (x, y) be piW (i, k, (x, y)), where i = m (male)
or f (female), k = T or E. Due to random matching, a male will be matched by a
female with T norm with probability y and a female with E norm with probability
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1−y. For example, a male with T norm will have the expected payoff, 3ny+n(1−y).
Similarly the expected payoffs of other cases are as follows:
piW (m,T, (x, y)) = 3ny + n(1− y) (2.3)
piW (m,E, (x, y)) = (3n− g)y + (2n− g)(1− y)
piW (f, T, (x, y)) = 3nx+ 3n(1− x) = 3n
piW (f, E, (x, y)) = (n+ w)x+ (2n+ w)(1− x)
Agents derive utilities from social interactions by conforming their norms to others.
Let the degree of conformism be σ. The conformist payoff of a norm will become
higher as more people adopt the norm, so the conformist payoff also depends on
the population fraction of the norm. Let piB(i, k, (x, y)) be the conformist payoff of
a player i with a norm k in a population state (x, y). Then,
piB(m,T, (x, y)) = xσ, piB(m,E, (x, y)) = (1− x)σ
piB(f, T, (x, y)) = yσ, piB(f, E, (x, y)) = (1− y)σ
The total payoff of an individual i with a k norm in a population state (x, y) is
denoted by U(i, k, (x, y)) = piW (i, k, (x, y)) + piB(i, k, (x, y)). The total payoffs are:
U(m,T, (x, y)) = 3ny + n(1− y) + xσ (2.4)
U(m,E, (x, y)) = (3n− g)y + (2n− g)(1− y) + (1− x)σ
U(f, T, (x, y)) = 3n+ yσ
U(f, E, (x, y)) = (n+ w)x+ (2n+ w)(1− x) + (1− y)σ
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2.3 Coevolution of Norms and Fertility
The primary goal is to study the effect of conformism on the evolution of norms,
and consequently, fertility decisions. In this section I will study replicator dynamics
to find the asymptotically stable equilibrium. In a two-population and two-strategy
game, an asymptotically stable equilibrium is also an Evolutionary Stable Strategy
(ESS).
2.3.1 Equilibrium without Conformism
First, as a bench mark, I find the gender norm equilibrium and the correspond-
ing fertility without conformism. From the payoff matrix in (2.1), it is easy to
predict equilibrium. When women’s wages are very low, staying at home will be
the dominant strategy for a wife whomever she is matched with. Given that wives
stay at home, husbands are better off by not helping. Thus, everyone in the pop-
ulation adopts T norm. On the other hand, if women’s wages are very high, more
women will adopt an egalitarian norm and engage in market work, and husbands
also adopt an egalitarian norm corresponding to an increase in population frac-
tion of female with E norm. I will verify this intuition by solving the replicator
dynamics of the game.
The replicator equations for the game are given as:
x˙ = x(1− x){piW (m,T, (x, y))− piW (m,E, (x, y))} (2.5)
y˙ = y(1− y){piW (f, T, (x, y))− piW (f, E, (x, y))}
The stationary states for (2.5) are defined to be the state (x, y) where x˙ = 0
and y˙ = 0. By solving piW (m,T, (x, y)) = piW (m,E, (x, y)) and piW (f, T, (x, y)) =
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piW (f, E, (x, y)), all stationary states can be found.
(x∗, y∗) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (
w − n
n
, y), (x,
n− g
n
)
It is easy to check that x˙ > 0 if y > n−g
n
and y˙ > 0 if x > w−n
n
. Note that the
asymptotically stable equilibrium of the replicator dynamics differs depending on
women’s market wage, and this gives three wage regimes:
(i) w < n, (ii) n < w < 2n, (iii) 2n < w (2.6)
Since n > g, the value n−g
n
lies between 0 and 1. Thus, the population fraction of
male with T norm will increase if the population fraction of female with T norm
is greater than n−g
n
and vice versa. This holds for all three cases. Regarding the
evolution of y, each wage regime will induce different results. For the case (i), the
value w−n
n
is negative; then x > w−n
n
> 0 and y˙ > 0 for all values of x. All the
states converge to the state (1,1) in which everyone adopts T norm and families
have high fertility. In the case of (iii), the value w−n
n
is greater than 1, which implies
x < w−n
n
< 1 and y˙ < 0 for all values of x. As a result, the population fraction of
female with T norm decreases. Thus, the state (0,0), in which all adopt E norm,
is the only asymptotically stable state for the case. The vector field diagrams for
the three cases are given in Figure 4. Panel I, II, and III correspond to the case
(i), (ii), and (iii).
For the case (ii), there are two asymptotically stable equilibria and correspond-
ing two ESSs. The value w−n
n
is between 0 and 1; thus, y can increase or decrease
contingent on the state of x whether x is greater or less than w−n
n
. “History mat-
ters” in this case because a population will move towards (1,1) or (0,0) depending
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Figure 4. Replicator dynamics and ESS without conformism Panel I,
II, and III show the replicator dynamics for (i) w < n, (ii) n < w < 2n, and
(iii) 2n < w, respectively. The ESSs are shown in bold dots. The vertical and
horizontal lines inside the boxes are trajectories of the stationary states.
on the initial state as shown in Panel II. Note that when there is no conformism
the mismatched norm cannot be an ESS. Proposition 2.3.1 reports the result.
Proposition 2.3.1 There are the following fertility regimes as a result of the evo-
lution of gender norms.
• If women’s wage is sufficiently low such that w < n, the population state of
all male and female adopting a separate spheres norm is an ESS and families
will have high fertility.
• If women’s wage is an intermediate level such that n < w < 2n, both all
adopting a separate spheres norm and having high fertility and all adopting a
shared care norm and having intermediate level fertility are ESSs.
• If women’s wage is sufficiently high such that 2n < w, the population state of
all male and female adopting a shared care norm is an ESS and families will
have intermediate level fertility.
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Figure 5. Replicator dynamics with conformist payoff only The vertical
and horizontal lines inside the box are trajectories of the stationary states. The
states, (x, y) = (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (1, 1) are ESS.
2.3.2 Equilibrium with Conformism
As an extreme case, consider first that individuals care only about what others
do; people have only conformist payoffs. Then the replicator equations are given
as:
x˙ = x(1− x){piB(m,T, (x, y))− piB(m,E, (x, y))}
y˙ = y(1− y){piB(f, T, (x, y))− piB(f, E, (x, y))}
The stationary states are (x∗, y∗) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (1
2
, y), (x, 1
2
). In-
dividuals simply adopt the norm which is prevalent (greater than 1
2
) in a society.
The vector field diagram is given in Figure 5. All four states, (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and
(1,1), are asymptotically stable and ESS.
Now I study equilibrium with conformism. Agents update their norms consid-
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Figure 6. Replicator dynamics with within-family and conformist
payoffs The lines inside the box are trajectories of the stationary states.
The shaded area is the basin of attraction for the population state (1, 0).
ering both payoffs. The replicator equations are given as:
x˙ = x(1− x){U(m,T, (x, y))− U(m,E, (x, y))} (2.7)
y˙ = y(1− y){U(f, T, (x, y))− U(f, E, (x, y))}
From the equation system (2.7), we can find the critical values ensuring x˙ = 0 and
y˙ = 0 are (x, y) satisfying both x = 1
2
+ n−g
2σ
− n
2σ
y and y = 1
2
+w−n
2σ
− n
2σ
x. Conformist
payoff tilts the solution trajectories. Now the mismatched norm outcome can be
asymptotically stable and ESS. Figure 6 illustrates the situation.
The condition, under which the state (1,0) is asymtotically stable and becomes
an ESS, can be seen in Figure 6. The shaded area is the basin of attraction for the
state (1,0). If an initial population lies in the shaded area, it will converge to the
mismatched norm equilibrium (1,0). The stationary solution trajectory of x˙ = 0
includes the state (x, y) = (1
2
+ n−g
2σ
, 0) and y˙ = 0 includes the state (1, 1
2
− 2n−w
2σ
).
The state (1,0) will have a basin of attraction when x = 1
2
+ n−g
2σ
lies between 0 and
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1 for x˙ = 0 trajectory; and y = 1
2
− 2n−w
2σ
lies between 0 and 1 for y˙ = 0 trajectory.
This leads to the following Proposition 2.3.2:
Proposition 2.3.2 Suppose the degree of conformism is sufficiently high such that
σ > n− g and σ > |2n− w|. Then the state (1,0) is an ESS and it has a basin of
attraction satisfying x > 1
2
+ n−g
2σ
− n
2σ
y and y < 1
2
+ w−n
2σ
− n
2σ
x.
Proof. If x > 1
2
+ n−g
2σ
− n
2σ
y and y < 1
2
+ w−n
2σ
− n
2σ
x, we have x˙ > 0 and y˙ < 0
from (2.7). Thus, the population fraction of males with T norm and the population
fraction of females with E norm increase, converging to the state (1,0).
Now I explore how conformism alters a society’s norm equilibrium and fertility.
Consider the case (iii) when wage is high, w > 2n, in (2.6). The state (0, 0), all
males and females adopt E norm, is the only ESS if there is no conformism. If the
degree of conformism is high enough such that σ > n − g, then the set of states
satisfying x > 1
2
+ n−g
2σ
− n
2σ
y and y < 1
2
+ w−n
2σ
− n
2σ
x converges to the state (1,0); all
males adopt T norm while all females adopt E norm, and families will have very
low fertility. Figure 7 shows an example of the case (iii). The left hand side graph
describes the vector field of the replicator dynamics without conformism and the
right hand side graph is the vector field with conformism.
The Proposition 2.3.2 suggests that under conformism, there can be multiple
ESSs even though a unique ESS is obtained without conformism. This illustrates
the role of conformism in explaining mismatched norms and low fertility equilib-
rium. Consider two societies with traditional norms: one with a relatively low
degree of conformism and the other with a relatively high degree of conformism.
Suppose women’s market wage increased sufficiently in both societies. In a society
with weak conformism, people will transform their attitude to being egalitarian,
responding to the change in economic incentives. This can happen even when the
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Figure 7. Replicator dynamics with and without conformism The
vector fields illustrate the case (iii) when women’s wage is high. Panel A
shows the replicator dynamics of the case without conformism and its ESS is
(x, y) = (0, 0). Panel B is for the case with conformism and its ESSs
are (x, y) = (0, 0), (1, 0), and (1, 1).
majority of the population is still traditional because the loss in the conformist
payoff by shifting to minor norms (egalitarian norm) can be compensated by an
increase in within-family payoff. In the end the entire population of the society will
become egalitarian and the society will converge to shared care norms. However, in
a society with strong conformism men would stick to the existing traditional norm
while women change their attitude to an egalitarian norm. This can happen when
the gains by shifting to an egalitarian norm and engaging in market work dominate
the lost conformist payoff of being traditional for women, but are insufficient for
men. As a result, a society with strong conformism converges to the mismatched
norm equilibrium and will have very low fertility. Conformism stagnates the tran-
sition of a society from being traditional to egalitarian.
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2.4 Equilibrium Selection: Stochastic Evolutionary Model
In the previous section, we have seen that conformism induces multiple equi-
libria. Now the question is which of the equilibria is likely to be observed in the
long-run? The deterministic dynamic is limited in the sense that it cannot predict a
unique equilibrium. I employ a stochastic evolutionary model to study equilibrium
selection. First, I define a continuous time Markov process. Each agent possesses
a random alarm clock with the same rate 1. The first time one of the alarm clocks
goes off, the agent possessing that clock receives the norm updating opportunity
and the chosen agent updates his or her norm according to a norm updating prob-
ability which will be specified later. After the norm updating, the agent picks his
or her partner randomly from the opposite sex population and forms a family.
Since only one agent is to revise his or her strategy at a time, the states change
only by 1
N
. Let x± = x± 1
N
and y± = y ± 1
N
for shorthand notation to denote the
changes in states. When an individual is chosen to update his or her norm given a
state (x, y), there are four possible transitions from the current state to a different
state: (x+, y), (x−, y), (x, y+) and (x, y−). For any two states (x, y), (x, y)′ ∈ S
and (x, y) 6= (x, y)′, I assign a nonnegative number α((x, y), (x, y)′) that denotes
the rate at which the chain changes from the state (x, y) to the state (x, y)′ (Lawler,
2006). For example, α((x, y), (x+, y)) is the revision rate at which a male with E
norm is chosen, and given the payoffs, he updates his norm from E to T . The
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revision rates are as follows:
α((x, y), (x+, y)) = (1− x)
exp[ 1
η
U(m,T, (x+, y))]
exp[ 1
η
U(m,E, (x, y))] + exp[ 1
η
U(m,T, (x+, y))]
(2.8)
α((x, y), (x−, y)) = x
exp[ 1
η
U(m,E, (x−, y))]
exp[ 1
η
U(m,T, (x, y))] + exp[ 1
η
U(m,E, (x−, y))]
α((x, y), (x, y+)) = (1− y)
exp[ 1
η
U(f, T, (x, y+))]
exp[ 1
η
U(f, E, (x, y))] + exp[ 1
η
U(f, T, (x, y+))]
α((x, y), (x, y−)) = y
exp[ 1
η
U(f, E, (x, y−))]
exp[ 1
η
U(f, T, (x, y))] + exp[ 1
η
U(f, E, (x, y−))]
The values inside the exponential function are the total payoff of individual i with
his or her norm given a state. Thus, the revision rate increases in the payoff of
the target norm to which the revising-agent changes his or her current norm. For
the revision rate in (2.8), I use so-called “clever payoff evaluation” rule (Sandholm,
1998). This means that each agent compares the payoff of the current strategy in
the current state and the payoff of the target strategy in the future state in which
the agent plays his or her target strategy. The parameter η ≥ 0 is the parameter
representing the degree of noise. When η → ∞, the terms in the revision rates in
(2.8) approach 1
2
, implying that the strategy-revising individuals ignore the payoffs
and randomize between strategies. This case represents the situation where the
observations of payoffs are too noisy, so the individual decision is highly perturbed
by a noise. If η → 0, then the terms in revision rates assume the value 1 if and only
if the utility of the target strategy is higher than the utility of the current strategy.
In other words, the strategy-revising individual surely chooses the best response in
a given state. In this case, highly rational behaviors pervade with no perturbation.
For this reason, equation (2.8) is called a “perturbed best response rule” and the
parameter η captures the degree of noise in the system.
44
In stochastic evolutionary game theory, the potential functions are frequently
adopted to find the explicit expressions for the stationary distribution. I first define
a function V, called a “potential function”:
V (x, y) = N [gxy + (g − 2n+ w)x(1− y) + (w − n)(1− x)(1− y)] (2.9)
+
N
2
[x2σ + y2σ + (1− x)2σ + (1− y)2σ]
The first term comes from within-family payoffs depending on the spouse’s norm;
the second term from the conformist payoffs.
Since the state space is finite and the chain is irreducible (any state can be
reached by any other state), the system admits a unique stationary distribution
(Lawler, 2006). Let L be the infinitesimal generator of the chain specifying rates
at which the chain jumps from a current state to a new state: (L)((x,y),(x,y)′) =
α((x, y), (x, y)′) if (x, y) 6= (x, y)′ and (L)((x,y),(x,y)) = −
∑
(x,y)′∈S α((x, y), (x, y)
′).
Then the stationary distribution is defined as follows:
µ({x, y}) =
(
N
Nx
)(
N
Ny
)
exp[ 1
η
V (x, y)]∑
(x,y)∈S
(
N
Nx
)(
N
Ny
)
exp[ 1
η
V (x, y)]
(2.10)
The condition for detailed balances needs to be checked, i.e.
µ((x, y))α((x, y), (x, y)′)
= µ((x, y)′)α((x, y)′, (x, y)), for all (x, y) and (x, y)′
There are only four possible cases to check.
α((x, y), (x±, y))
α((x±, y), (x, y))
=
µ({x±, y})
µ({x, y})
,
α((x, y), (x, y±))
α((x, y±), (x, y))
=
µ({x, y±})
µ({x, y})
45
By symmetry, it is enough to show for the case of (x+, y) and (x, y+).
Proposition 2.4.1 (Stationary distribution) The stationary distribution for the
Markov chain defined by L is given by (2.10).
Proof. First I check the reversibility between the states (x, y) and (x+, y). I
find the ratio of the revision rates from (2.4) and (2.8) as follows:
α((x, y), (x+, y))
α((x+, y), (x, y))
=
1− x
x+
exp[βU(m,T,(x+,y))]
exp[βU(m,E,(x,y))]+exp[βU(m,T,(x+,y))]
exp[βU(m,E,(x,y))]
exp[βU(m,T,(x+,y))]+exp[βU(m,E,(x,y))]
=
1− x
x+
exp[βU(m,T, (x+, y))]
exp[βU(m,E, (x, y))]
=
1− x
x+
exp[β{U(m,T, (x+, y))− U(m,E, (x, y))}]
=
1− x
x+
exp[β{3ny + n(1− y) + x+σ
−(3n− g)y − (2n− g)(1− y)− (1− x)σ}]
=
1− x
x+
exp[β{gy − (n− g)(1− y) + 2σx+ (
1−N
N
)σ}]
Then I find the ratio of stationary distributions from (2.10):
µ({x+, y})
µ({x, y})
=
( NNx+)(
N
Ny) exp[
1
η
V (x+,y)]
∑
(x,y)∈S (
N
Nx)(
N
Ny) exp[
1
η
V (x,y)]
( NNx)(
N
Ny) exp[
1
η
V (x,y)]
∑
(x,y)∈S (
N
Nx)(
N
Ny) exp[
1
η
V (x,y)]
= exp[β{V (x+, y)− V (x, y)}]
(
N
Nx+
)(
N
Ny
)
(
N
Nx
)(
N
Ny
)
I show the result of the ratio of the reference distributions first.
(
N
Nx+
)(
N
Ny
)
(
N
Nx
)(
N
Ny
) =
N !
(Nx+)!(N−Nx+)!
N !
Nx!(N−Nx)!
=
1− x
x+
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Using the potential function (2.9), the term V (x+, y) − V (x, y) can be calculated
as follows:
V (x+, y)− V (x, y)
= N [gx+y + (g − 2n+ w)x+(1− y) + (w − n)(1− x+)(1− y)
−gxy − (g − 2n+ w)x(1− y)− (w − n)(1− x)(1− y)]
+
N
2
[(x+)2σ + y2σ + (1− x+)2σ + (1− y)2σ
−x2σ − y2σ − (1− x)2σ − (1− y)2σ]
= gy − (n− g)(1− y) + 2σx+ (
1−N
N
)σ
From the two results above, I have
µ({x+, y})
µ({x, y})
=
1− x
x+
exp[βN(gy − (n− g)(1− y) + 2σx)]
Similarly, I check the reversibility between (x, y) and (x, y+). I find the ratio of the
revision rates from (2.4) and (2.8) as follows:
α((x, y), (x, y+))
α((x, y+), (x, y))
=
1− y
y+
exp[βU(f,T,(x,y+))]
exp[βU(f,E,(x,y))]+exp[βU(f,T,(x,y+))]
exp[βU(f,E,(x,y))]
exp[βU(f,T,(x,y+))]+exp[βU(f,E,(x,y))]
=
1− y
y+
exp[βU(f, T, (x, y+))]
exp[βU(f, E, (x, y))]
=
1− y
y+
exp[β{U(f, T, (x, y+))− U(f, E, (x, y))}]
=
1− y
y+
exp[β{nx+ n− w + 2σy + (
1−N
N
)σ}]
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Then I find the ratio of stationary distributions from (2.9) and (2.10) :
µ({x, y+})
µ({x, y})
=
( NNx)(
N
Ny+) exp[
1
η
V (x,y+)]
∑
(x,y)∈S (
N
Nx)(
N
Ny) exp[
1
η
V (x,y)]
( NNx)(
N
Ny) exp[
1
η
V (x,y)]
∑
(x,y)∈S (
N
Nx)(
N
Ny) exp[
1
η
V (x,y)]
= exp[β{V (x, y+)− V (x, y)}]
(
N
Nx
)(
N
Ny+
)
(
N
Nx
)(
N
Ny
)
Then, by the similar calculation, I have
(
N
Nx
)(
N
Ny+
)
(
N
Nx
)(
N
Ny
) = 1− y
y+
V (x, y+)− V (x, y) = nx+ n− w + 2σy + (
1−N
N
)σ
Therefore, I have the following result.
µ({x, y+})
µ({x, y})
=
1− y
y+
exp[β{nx+ n− w + 2σy + (
1−N
N
)σ}]
I verify that the distribution (2.9) satisfies the detailed balances.
Young (1998) studies a given Markov process and its perturbed Markov pro-
cesses by adding small errors and defines a stochastically stable state as a state
with a positive probability when the perturbation vanishes. In our current setting,
the perturbed processes in Young’s specification correspond to the class of stochas-
tic processes defined by L parameterized by η, and the unperturbed process can
be viewed as the best response dynamics obtained by η → 0. The Stochastically
Stable State (SSS), thus, concerns only the state when η vanishes. Compared to
this, the advantage of the explicit expression for the stationary distribution (2.10)
is its both allowing us to study the case of non-vanishing η as well as the limit
of vanishing η and providing more information about the long-run property of the
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system than does SSS.
The state (x, y), which maximizes the potential function V (x, y), is the SSS of
the game since as η → 0, all weights will be put on this state. From the shape of
potential function V, it is easy to see that the local maximum occurs only at the
vertices, (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 0). Thus, SSS is where the potential function,
V, is maximized. Plugging these four states into (2.9) gives
V (1, 1) = Ng +Nσ (2.11)
V (0, 0) = N(w − n) +Nσ
V (1, 0) = N(g − 2n+ w) +Nσ
V (0, 1) = Nσ
First, it is obvious that the state (0, 1) and (1, 0) cannot be an SSS because g > 0
and n > g, V (0, 1) < V (1, 1) and V (1, 0) < V (0, 0). State (1,1) or (0,0) will be
an SSS. When w < n + g, the value of the potential function at the state of all
male and female adopting T norm is higher than the value of the potential function
at the state of all male and female adopting E norm, i.e. V (1, 1) > V (0, 0). The
following results hold.
(1) (x, y) = (1, 1) is SSS if w < n+ g
(2) (x, y) = (0, 0) is SSS if w > n+ g
Wive’s wages (w), the utility from children (n), and husbands’ cost of childrear-
ing (g) determine SSS. Proposition 2.4.2 reports the results regarding equilibrium
norms and fertility.
Proposition 2.4.2 Depending on women’s wage and the cost of childrearing, there
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are the following fertility regimes as a result of the evolution of gender norms.
• If women’s wage is sufficiently low such that w < n+g, all males and females
adopt a separate spheres norm and high fertility is likely to be observed.
• If women’s wage is sufficiently high such that w > n + g, all males and
females adopt a shared care norm and intermediate level of fertility is likely
to be observed.
In the previous section, we have seen that there are different ESSs correspond-
ing to women’s market wage. Cases (i) and (iii) have only one ESS for each, so
equilibrium selection is not required. But case (ii) has two ESSs, and the long run
equilibrium can be selected using the result of Proposition 2.4.2. If n < w < n+ g,
the separate spheres norm will be selected, but if n+ g < w < 2n, the shared care
norm will be selected.
Equation (2.11) shows that the conformist component in the potential function,
Nσ, appears in all four states, implying that conformism does not alter the equi-
librium selection. In this model, the equilibrium selection process totally depends
on the underlying payoffs within families. The reason is because of the assumption
that the degree of conformism toward both norms is equal. Since conformist behav-
ior adopts a frequent norm in a population, it is reasonable to assume an unbiased
degree of conformism. However, the model can be easily modified to make the
degree of conformism vary by gender. Let σm and σf be the degree of conformism
by male and female, respectively. Then the potential function in (2.9) becomes
V (x, y) = N [gxy + (g − 2n+ w)x(1− y) + (w − n)(1− x)(1− y)]
+
N
2
[x2σm + y
2σf + (1− x)
2σm + (1− y)
2σf ]
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And the corresponding potentials of four states are
V (1, 1) = Ng +
N
2
(σm + σf )
V (0, 0) = N(w − n) +
N
2
(σm + σf )
V (1, 0) = N(g − 2n+ w) +
N
2
(σm + σf )
V (0, 1) =
N
2
(σm + σf )
Similar to the unbiased degree of conformism, the conformist component in the
potential function, N
2
(σm + σf ), appears in all four states. Even though different
degrees of conformism by gender are allowed, this does not alter the SSS chosen
in the case without conformism. According to the model, the mismatched norm
state may be an absorbing state for a while, but as long as women’s market work
is compensated sufficiently highly, we will observe intermediate level fertility in the
long-run.
2.5 Conclusion
I explore the evolution of gender norms and fertility regimes in the presence of
conformism under various economic environments and show how conformism alters
the equilibrium. For example, even though families with both spouses having shared
care norms receive higher within-family payoffs than families with mismatched
norms (male with T norm and female with E norm), and if individuals obtain strong
conformist payoffs, the state of mismatched norms might be an ESS or an absorbing
state in the evolutionary process. In this paper I confine the investigation to the
evolution of gender norms and fertility, but the result holds for any asymmetric
game that admits potential functions.
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According to the choice rule, I adopted the perturbed best response. Perturbed
best response works as follows; when an individual is chosen to revise his strategy,
he/she chooses the strategy with the highest payoff among all possible strategies
with some degree of mistakes. Specifically I adopt the “logit choice rule”(McKelvey
and Palfrey, 1995; Young, 1998). In this case one can choose any strategies even
though they have disappeared in the system, so the stochastic process is irreducible
(every state can be reached from an arbitrary state by the evolution of time) and
admits a unique stationary distribution. The advantage of the logit choice rule
is that under this strategy-revision rule, the unique stationary distribution can
be computed explicitly; thus, one can easily study the long run property of the
system, e.g. stochastic stabilities, by analyzing the expression of the stationary
distribution. By contrast, the imitation rule is such that upon revision opportunity
an agent compares his/her payoff of current strategy to the payoff of a matched
agent, and he/she imitates the other agent’s strategy only when the other’s payoff
is higher (Weibull, 1995). Under this dynamic if some strategies disappear, they
do not reappear in the system; thus, the system is reducible and admits multiple
absorbing states. Accommodating an imitation rule to this model would prove an
interesting extension.
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CHAPTER 3
DO PUBLIC TRANSFERS CROWD OUT PRIVATE
SUPPORT TO THE ELDERLY? EVIDENCE FROM THE
BASIC OLD AGE PENSION IN SOUTH KOREA
3.1 Introduction
Intergenerational transfers from adult children to their elderly parents have
played a crucial role in old-age income security in some countries. Financial as-
sistance from adult children still represents a substantial portion of the elderly’s
income in many developing countries. However, economic development and wage
employment increase the earning opportunities of adult children outside the family,
making them less dependent on family assets and reducing the economic incentives
for transfers to parents. Public pension systems serve as an enforcement device
that makes it impossible for the younger generation to free ride and default on its
obligations to the older generation (Sinn, 2004). Public pension systems were first
introduced in Germany to improve the miserable conditions of the elderly. Most of
the advanced capitalist countries now have either universal or means-tested public
pension systems, and many developing countries such as South Africa and South
Korea have established such systems since the 1990s.
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Redistribution policies targeting the poor elderly in developing countries may
have limited effectiveness if public intergenerational transfers “crowd out” private
transfers. From an empirical point of view, it is difficult to directly test the effect
of public transfers on private transfers, partly because of the lack of adequate data:
data sets containing both private transfers and public transfers are scarce. Many
developing countries for which information about private transfers exists have no
public pension programs or spend only a negligible fraction of their budgets on
public transfers of income.
Most empirical research on inter-vivos transfers has focused on affluent coun-
tries such as the U.S. But public pension systems have been adopted long ago in
those countries, making it hard to find exogenously introduced public transfers
data. Empirical studies of developed countries test the crowding-out hypothesis
by examining the changes in private transfers in response to changes in income
of recipients and donors. In advanced countries, net private cash transfers flow
downwards, so parents are donors and adult children are recipients, while the flow
is opposite in developing countries.
Most of these studies, however, suffer from endogeneity problems. If individu-
als adjust their income because they receive or expect to receive private transfers,
income effects on private transfers can be under-estimated. If omitted variables are
positively correlated with both income and private transfer receipts, income effects
can be over-estimated (Juarez, 2009). The best way to address the endogeneity
problem is to exploit a natural experiment in which an exogenous increase in pub-
lic transfers occurs, affecting some, but not all, potential recipients of both private
and public transfers. A couple of recent studies have addressed endogeneity prob-
lems by using exogenously introduced public transfers. Jensen (2003) assesses the
crowding out effect of the rapidly increased state old age pensions in 1992 in South
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Africa. Juarez (2009) estimates the marginal effects of income on the amount of
private transfers received by elderly, using eligibility for a demogrant for Mexico
City residents who are at least 70 years old as an instrument variable.
Recent policy changes in South Korea provide another opportunity. The Korean
government introduced a non-contributory public transfer program, the so-called
“Basic Old Age Pension,” beginning January 2008. This pension is given to individ-
uals aged 65 and above in the bottom 60% of the income and property distribution
of the elderly population. The Korean Retirement and Income Study collects data
on private transfers as well as the amount of money that each individual received
as “Basic Old Age Pension” (BOAP). In contrast to both studies (Jensen, 2003;
Juarez, 2009) which use repeated cross sectional data, the KReIS is a longitudinal
survey, making it possible to track the changes in private transfers for individuals
before and after the Basic Old Age Pension. I use this data to test the hypothesis
that public transfers have crowded out private transfers in Korea. I estimate the
crowding out effect employing the Difference-in-Difference method, comparing the
change in private transfers before and after receipt of the Basic Old Age Pension
for pensioners and non-pensioners.
In section 2 I review the relevant theories on crowding out, and in section 3 I
provide information on the Basic Old Age Pension in Korea. In Section 4 I describe
the data set and outline my empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results.
3.2 Literature Review
Whether public transfers crowd out private transfers depends on the relative
importance of economic incentives versus altruistic preferences in the provision of
private transfers (see Cox (1987); Cox and Fafchamps (2008) for a comprehensive
55
survey of this issue). Barro (1974), for instance, argues that if the motivation is
altruistic, the redistribution of a dollar from donors to recipients through public
transfers will be fully offset by corresponding decreases in private transfers, having
little effect on the distribution of economic well-being. However, if private transfers
are implicit payments for the services provided by recipients (exchange motivation),
private transfers could increase along with the income of the recipients (Bernheim,
Shleifer, and Summers, 1985; Cox and Rank, 1992). According to Cox (1987), given
the exchange motive, increases in recipients’ income would decrease their supply
of services and cause an upward movement along the donors’ demand, raising the
implicit price of services. Thus, if recipients’ services lack close substitutes, the
demand would be inelastic and the amount of the transfer would increase with the
recipients’ income. In this case redistribution can be reinforced. Cox (1987) also
shows that altruism is more likely to dominate when the income of the recipient is
lower, implying that relatively poor individuals could experience larger reduction in
private transfers when they receive public transfers. Not only inter-vivos transfers
but bequests are another form of private transfers. Bernheim, Shleifer, and Sum-
mers (1985) explore the implications of exchange motivation. They find positive
correlation between children’s services (contacts) to their parents and the parents’
estate in the U.S. in 1969–75. On the other hand, Tomes (1981) using a sample of
estates probated in the Cleveland, Ohio, area in 1964-65, finds that larger bequests
are associated with lower recipient income, which is consistent with altruism.
Most empirical studies of inter-vivo transfers in advanced countries show that
crowding out either does not take place (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Cox, 1987; Cox and
Rank, 1992; Cox, 1998) or is negligible (Cox and Jakubson, 1995; Altonji, Hayashi,
and Kotlikoff, 1997). Cox and Rank (1992) find that the coefficient of recipient
(adult children) earnings minus the coefficient of parental earnings is only 0.3, which
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should be -1 under the null hypothesis of altruism. Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff
(1997) find that private transfers decrease by 13 cents per dollar. Recent studies
directly testing the crowding out effect of public transfers in developing countries
show mixed results. Albarran and Attanasio (2002) studying the PROGRESA
programme in Mexico show there is no crowding out. Juarez (2009) finds that a
one peso increase in the elderly’s income decreases the private transfers they receive
by 86 cents. Jensen (2003) also finds an additional rand of public pension income
decreases private transfers by 0.30 rand in South Africa.
There are reasons other than the exchange motive that crowding out might
not occur. First, working age adults may derive more satisfaction from providing
transfers to elderly parents themselves than by the government in what Andreoni
(1989, 1990) terms “warm glow” giving with impure altruism. Second, either a
filial norm that adult children should take care of their old parents or social norms
regarding minimum acceptable living standards may influence transfers. Children
in countries with strong family ties and filial norms may be less responsive in their
private transfers to the introduction of public transfers to their elder parents. If
publicly provided transfers do not boost the elderly parents above a threshold,
adult children would still provide support to help their parents achieve the socially
acceptable minimum. Only if public transfers lift elderly parents over the threshold
would children’s contributions be completely crowded out. Third, if adult children
treat parents the way they hope to be treated by their own children, hoping to es-
tablish a “demonstration effect”, then crowding out may not occur (Cox and Stark,
1996). It is important to point out that altruistic motivation induces crowding out
only in the standard model of altruism in which other regarding preferences place a
positive weight on someone else’s utility (e.g. Becker and others). Ethical motiva-
tions such as filial norms do not necessarily induce crowding out as in the standard
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treatment of altruism.
This essay will build on the existing literature in three ways: i) providing a
direct test of the crowding out effect of public transfers by using data including
both public and private transfers; ii) providing a more accurate test of this issue
by employing panel data; iii) adding empirical results from the South Korean case
in particular.
3.3 Description of the Basic Old Age Pension (BOAP)
Korea’s population is rapidly aging. The elderly (65 and older) portion of the
total population was 5.1% in 1990 but more than doubled to 11.8% in 2012. Pub-
licly mandated old age income security in Korea consists of public pension schemes
and retirement allowance programs. The public pension schemes are divided into
two groups: the Special Occupational Pension Schemes (SOPS) for civil servants,
military personnel, and private school teachers; and the National Pension System
(NPS) for the rest of the population. The National Pension System was expanded
nation-wide in the late 1990s. According to the Social Survey conducted by Statis-
tics Korea in 2012, only 31.8% of population aged 65 and above benefited from
public income security schemes; 40.2% of the aged population regarded ‘financial
difficulty’ as their most serious problem; 32.1% of the aged population reported no
income or property. In that year, 38% of the population aged 65 and above lived
together with adult children.
In January 2008, to alleviate the economic hardship of the elderly, the Ko-
rean government introduced the Basic Old Age Pension for those at least 70 years
old (extended to those aged 65 and above beginning July 2008). It is a kind of
demogrant because it is neither taxable nor requires previous contribution. The
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government establishes the baseline level of income and property to be eligible for
the Basic Old-Age Pension. Those people who lie in the bottom 60% of income
distribution of the entire elderly population over 65 in 2008 were eligible for the
pension. Beginning in 2009, the pension covers the bottom 70% of the entire elderly
population aged 65 and above.
Only the income and property of a person and his or her spouse is counted.
The income and property of the person responsible for supporting the elderly (such
as adult children) are not considered and private transfer income is not recognized
as income. The monthly recognized income is the sum of monthly income and
property converted to a monthly amount at an annual interest rate of 5% (8% for
financial property). The monthly pension payment is 84,000 KRW (about $76) for
a single person and if both spouses are eligible for the pension, then each receives
67,000 KRW ($61) (each with 20% reduction from a single recipient payment).
Table 1 reports the monthly pension as a percentage of monthly income for the
recipients. This pension represents a substantial amount of the pensioner’s income,
accounting for 13-39% of income in 2008. There is a large difference between men
and women in terms of monthly income. Women’s income is much less than men
and elderly women are clearly more dependent on the pension than elderly men.
Single recipients Married recipients Total
men women men women
monthly income 669.77 329.90 1059.90 175.40 568.92
(1345.43) (874.89) (1621.01) (496.79) (1223.52)
monthly pension 83.79 82.99 71.46 68.32 76.02
amount received (8.20) (7.74) (11.00) (9.00) (11.28)
% of pension in income 12.51% 25.16% 6.74% 38.95% 13.36%
Table 1. The Basic Old Age Pension and income of recipients in 2008
All money values are in 2008 KRW (in thousand). Standard deviations are in
parentheses. Source: Author’s calculation using the pension recipients from the
Korean Retirement and Income Study(KReIS).
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For all elderly aged 60 or above in the survey, the monthly income (not including
BOAP) for single male is 700,000 KRW and for single female is 330,000 KRW,
while the monthly income for a married male is 1,060,000 KRW and for a married
female is 175,000 KRW.
Table 2 shows the classification of recipients by pension amount in February
2008. Conditional on pension eligibility, 94% of recipients are paid a fixed amount
(maximum) regardless of their income level. The remaining 6% are paid an adjusted
amount to prevent income reversal between recipients and non-recipients so that
the income of recipients after the pension will still remain lower than the income
of non-pensioners.
Total Number Number of Recipients
classification of recipients received max amount %
Single recipient 1,302,404 1,251,243a 96.10%
Single recipient with spouse 172,331 158,360a 91.90%
Both spouses received 472,476 429,124b 90.80%
Total 1,947,211 1,838,727 94%
Table 2. All recipients by pension amount as of February 2008 a:
84,000 KRW, b: 67,000 KRW. Source: Ministry for Health
Welfare and Family Affairs, 2008.
3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
I used a sample of individuals at least 60 years old from the Korean Retire-
ment and Income Study. This is a longitudinal survey conducted every two years
by the National Pension Service since 2005. I used the second (2007) and third
(2009) survey1 to include the period before and after the Basic Old Age Pension.
1The survey asks participants to report their income of the previous year; thus, the incomes
are for the year of 2006 and 2008 respectively.
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The KReIS survey includes around 5,000 households with interviews of each house-
hold’s member over age 50, providing both individual and household level data.
It contains information on income from different sources including public pensions
and private cash transfers. In the second survey, personal questionnaires on income
and expenditures are collected by couples units, while by individuals in the third
survey. Thus, I separated the data into single and couple data sets. The number of
individuals aged 60 and above without a spouse who participated in both the 2nd
and 3rd surveys is 1489 (the number of female respondents is approximately five
times larger than that of male respondents) and the number of individuals aged 60
and above with spouses who participated in both the 2nd and 3rd surveys is 3714
(1857 couples).
To measure the crowding out effect of the Basic Old Age Pension on private
transfers to the elderly, I employ the Difference-in-Difference (DID) strategy, which
consists of comparing the change in private transfers for pensioners (treatment
group) to the change in private transfers for non-pensioners (control group). Let
Tigt denote private transfers of i who belongs to a group, g={Pensioners, Non-
pensioners}, at time t={Pre, Post} and let T igt be the mean of private transfers.
A simple DID estimator can be written as:
(T pensioner, post − T pensioner, pre)− (T non−pensioner, post − T non−pensioner, pre)
This removes biases in post-pension comparisons between the treatment and control
group that could result from permanent differences between those groups, as well
as biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group that could result from
trends. The underlying assumption for this DID strategy is that the outcome in
both the treatment and control groups would follow the same time trend in the
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absence of the treatment. Note that the assumption does not require both groups
to have the same mean for the subject of interest at a point in time.
The DID estimate can be calculated by subtracting the change in private trans-
fers for non-pensioners from the change in private transfers for pensioners. The
DID estimate and its standard error can be easily calculated when implemented as
a regression. The corresponding regression equation is
Tigt = β0 + β1Postt + β2Pensionerg + β3(Postt ∗ Pensionerg) + εigt (3.1)
The coefficient of the second-level interaction (β3) is the DID estimate which cap-
tures all variation in private transfers specific to the treatments (relative to con-
trols) for pensioners after the introduction of the national BOAP in 2008. The
interpretation of the coefficients of regression equation (3.1) is given below.
β̂0 = T non−pensioner, pre
β̂1 = T non−pensioner, post − T non−pensioner, pre
β̂2 = T pensioner, pre − T non−pensioner, pre
β̂3 = (T pensioner, post − T pensioner, pre)− (T non−pensioner, post − T non−pensioner, pre)
Demographic and individual characteristics might cause differences in private trans-
fers even for the same group. The sampling variance of the DID estimate can be
reduced by controlling for other observables that affect the private transfers. The
regression equation has the following form:
Tigt = β0 + β1Postt + β2Pensionerg + β3(Postt ∗ Pensionerg) + γXigt + εigt
where X is a vector of other observable individual characteristics such as income
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of recipients, household size, the number of children, education, sex, cohabitation
with adult children, health problems, and providing care for grandchildren.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Since the 1980s familial support for the elderly has declined in both financial
assistance and coresidence in Korea (Kim, 2010). According to Kim (2010), private
transfers from adult children to elderly parents (aged 60 or above) declined as a
percentage of elderly parent’s income from 72.4% in 1980, 56.3% in 1995, and 31.1%
in 2003. Table 3 and 4 provide summary statistics on private transfers between
parents and adult children as well as coresidence in 2006 and 2008, calculated from
the Korean Retirement and Income Study. I calculated net private transfers from
children by subtracting the total annual transfer to children from the total annual
transfer receipts from children.
I report transfers for those elderly aged 60 and above because the official retire-
ment age in Korea is 60 and the average effective age of retirement (the average
age of exit from the labor force) was 70 during 2006-2011 according to OECD
employment data. Earnings from jobs that people take after retiring from their
first job tend to be lower. Thus, I consider two age cohorts of the elderly sharing
similar characteristics regarding their structure of income throughout the analysis:
those aged 60-69 and those aged 70 and above. Since the elderly aged 65 or above
are eligible for the pension, I consider three age-thresholds, 60-64, 65-69 and 70 or
above in 2008.
Descriptive results for the single elderly are presented in Table 3. Transfers in
63
Age and Period Transfers Transfers Net transfer Coresidence
Pension from children to children from children
70+ Pre 2544.94 221.38 2330.19 0.43
Pensioner (3429.25) (787.1) (3416.37) (0.5)
Post 2045.56 89.42 1955.26 0.43
(3038.15) (428.16) (2975.09) (0.5)
70+ Pre 2968.64 686.1 2291.66 0.43
Non- (4431.22) (2424.29) (5159.47) (0.5)
pensioner Post 1870.7 336.76 1533.93 0.41
(3348.87) (1498.84) (3715.95) (0.49)
65-69 Pre 2737.45 285.68 2462.13 0.41
Pensioner (4141.14) (674.07) (4182.03) (0.49)
Post 2081.08 191.35 1902.22 0.38
(4911.18) (560.73) (4909.92) (0.49)
65-69 Pre 2783.31 680.69 2102.62 0.49
Non- (4168.75) (2144) (4920.58) (0.5)
pensioner Post 2183.53 252.69 1924.89 0.44
(3304.67) (1038.2) (3321.6) (0.5)
60-64 Pre 3378.15 251.85 3122.89 0.48
Bottom (4434.54) (961.74) (4521.12) (0.5)
60% Post 2307.39 107.71 2198.87 0.44
(3218.72) (423.34) (3193.5) (0.5)
60-64 Pre 3035.12 968.29 2066.83 0.61
Top 40% (3139.95) (2359) (4062.89) (0.49)
Post 1665.61 561.95 1103.66 0.51
(2594.6) (1546.27) (3053.44) (0.51)
Table 3. Average private transfers for the single elderly aged 60+
by pension receipt status and time All money values are in 2008
KRW (in thousand). Standard Deviations are in parentheses. Source: Author’s
calculation using a sample of the elderly aged 60 and above from the Korean
Retirement and Income Study.
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both directions from children and to children decreased in 2008 compared to 2006
for all age cohorts. Pensioners or relatively poor elderly (those in the bottom 60% of
income distribution among the participants in the survey) tended to receive larger
amounts of transfers from their children compared to non-pensioners or relatively
rich elderly (those in the top 40% of income distribution). For the single elderly
there was no significant change in coresidence in terms of age thresholds and pension
status.
Table 4 shows the values for elderly couples. Note that for couples aged 70 or
above, the net transfers from children increased in Post period (2008) relative to Pre
period (2006) for both pensioners and non-pensioners. Except for the elderly 70+,
financial support from children decreased for all couples. Net transfers from children
also increased for pensioners, relatively poor couples aged 60-64 and non-pensioner
couples aged 65-69, but this is not because adult children increased their support,
but because the reduction in transfers to children was lager than than the reduction
in transfers from children. It would be more informative to study both transfers
from children and net transfers from children. Transfers from children depend solely
on the adult children’s decision, whereas the net transfers from children depend on
both the parents’ and children’s decision. Since I lack data on children’s income,
it is implicitly assumed that children’s income is constant.
The percentage living with children decreases with age from roughly 60% for age
60-64 to 25% for 70 or above for elderly couples, while the percentage of coresidence
changed little for the single elderly. For all age cohorts of elderly couples, the
number of couples living with their children slightly decreased in 2008. Elderly
couples who are pensioners are less likely to coreside with adult children than
affluent elderly couples. The overall time trend of both financial and coresidence
(as a form of in-kind supports) is downward.
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Age and Period Transfers Transfers Net transfer Coresidence
Pension from children to children from children
70+ Pre 3259.57 494.45 2771.34 0.27
Pensioner (3898.72) (1390.04) (4245.46) (0.44)
Post 3522.97 327.76 3192.34 0.25
(5092.74) (861.51) (5095.13) (0.43)
70+ Pre 2893.41 888.97 2004.93 0.22
Non- (4213.72) (2396.48) (4763.43) (0.41)
pensioner Post 3077.38 574.58 2494.26 0.21
(4529.44) (2124.61) (5061.59) (0.4)
65-69 Pre 2988.56 566.03 2428.13 0.37
Pensioner (4343.65) (1201.81) (4429.55) (0.48)
Post 2554.41 615.72 1934.99 0.31
(3289.69) (3451.58) (4733.16) (0.47)
65-69 Pre 2002.93 1364.27 630.11 0.45
Non- (3879.25) (3939.69) (5763.29) (0.5)
pensioner Post 1680.14 778.82 890.72 0.35
(3871.86) (3554.68) (5310.39) (0.48)
60-64 Pre 2336.12 1395.19 963.13 0.59
Bottom (3701.43) (2970.92) (4616.86) (0.49)
60% Post 2215.31 685.49 1529.82 0.52
(4645.13) (2997.42) (5502.6) (0.5)
60-64 Pre 1712.99 3206.64 1493.66 0.63
Top 40% (4293.77) (5812.86) (7229.12) (0.49)
Post 1135.56 2529.9 1395.31 0.48
(2172.57) (6914.42) (7383.07) (0.5)
Table 4. Average private transfers for elderly couples aged 60+ by
pension receipt status and time Non-pensioner includes all couples
with no spouse receives pension. All money values are in 2008 KRW (in thou-
sand). Standard Deviations are in parentheses. Source: Author’s calculation
using a sample of the elderly aged 60 and above from the Korean Retirement
and Income Study.
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Single
Pensioner Non-pensioner
Variables Pre pension Post pension Pre pension Post pension
Income 2797.87 1593.54 7713.00 8882.44
(7984.68) (2623.42) (18367.06) (15784.22)
Household size 2.33 2.24 2.24 2.12
(1.65) (1.62) (1.54) (1.51)
No. of children 4.08 4.01 3.27 3.23
(1.99) (2.00) (1.67) (1.65)
Education 1.65 1.65 2.29 2.31
(0.84) (0.85) (1.19) (1.20)
Caregiving 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.10
(0.27) (0.22) (0.32) (0.31)
Health problem 0.71 0.76 0.69 0.72
(0.45) (0.43) (0.46) (0.45)
Couple
Pensioner Non-pensioner
Variables Pre pension Post pension Pre pension Post pension
Income 8250.97 5853.44 21825.86 21831.02
(13973.63) (6944.82) (20733.87) (23999.36)
Household size 2.73 2.66 2.89 2.72
(1.19) (1.18) (1.10) (1.04)
No. of children 4.03 3.98 3.18 3.16
(1.59) (1.55) (1.26) (1.25)
Education 2.58 2.59 3.37 3.40
(1.14) (1.16) (1.18) (1.21)
Caregiving 0.1281 0.085 0.1278 0.088
(0.3345) (0.279) (0.3341) (0.284)
Health problem 0.85 0.87 0.75 0.78
(0.36) (0.34) (0.43) (0.41)
Table 5. Summary statistics of selected variables for the elderly 60+
by pension receipt status and time Couple pensioner means that
at least one spouse receives pension. All money values are in 2008 KRW (in
thousand). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Source:Author’s calculation
using a sample of the elderly aged 60 and above from the Korean Retirement
and Income Study.
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Table 5 provides summary statistics of other control variables for the elderly
aged 60 and above by their pension status and time periods. The income shown in
Table 5 includes labor income, property income, and public and private pensions
except for the Basic Old Age Pension. Household size represents the number of
people living together. The caregiving variable is a dummy indicating whether
the respondent provided care for their grandchildren. The income of pensioners
decreased, whereas the income of non-pensioners increased or stayed the same.
Other than income, there is little difference in individual characteristics between
pensioners and non-pensioners.
3.5.2 Regression Results
Pensioners are at the bottom 60% of the income and property distribution of
the elderly population aged 65 or above, so I use age thresholds and income distri-
bution for identification. Regarding the income thresholds, the Korean government
establishes and announces the baseline level of income and property to be eligi-
ble for the Basic Old Age Pension annually. According to the baseline in 2008, I
construct the recognized income threshold and divide the elderly into two groups,
bottom 60% and top 40%. To control for age differences in private transfers, it
would be reasonable to make 70 the cut-off age. To determine the age threshold of
couples, I consider “couple-age” as the maximum of the two spouses’ ages. Thus, a
couple aged 60 or above implies that the couple has at least one spouse aged 60 or
above. A couple with at least one pensioner is considered to be a pensioner couple.
Table 6 and 7 provide summary statistics by age thresholds, pension status, and
time (before and after the introduction of national BOAP) for the single elderly
and elderly couples respectively.
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Age and Time Stats Income Household No. of Education Health Caregiving
Pension size children Problem
70+ Pre Mean 2413 2.3812 4.2046 1.5859 0.7272 0.0543
Pensioner SD 8209.8 1.6833 2.0475 0.8169 0.4457 0.2268
N 802 808 821 821 821 626
Post Mean 1350.7 2.2704 4.1328 1.594 0.7613 0.037
SD 2411.3 1.6207 2.0691 0.8242 0.4266 0.1889
N 717 821 821 821 821 514
70+ Pre Mean 6713 2.3706 3.7079 2.2079 0.7135 0.05
Non SD 8655.8 1.6987 1.8637 1.2472 0.4534 0.2187
pensioner N 166 170 178 178 178 140
Post Mean 9284.2 2.3034 3.6685 2.2393 0.7022 0.0345
SD 20969 1.6968 1.7999 1.2593 0.4586 0.1833
N 169 178 178 178 178 116
65-69 Pre Mean 4195.4 2.1165 3.6368 1.8726 0.6651 0.1647
Pensioner SD 7048.1 1.5161 1.6623 0.8858 0.4731 0.372
N 204 206 212 212 212 170
Post Mean 2597.5 2.1085 3.5802 1.8741 0.75 0.0897
SD 2992.5 1.6299 1.646 0.8909 0.434 0.2867
N 156 212 212 212 212 156
65-69 Pre Mean 8184.1 2.4253 3.1609 2.4483 0.6322 0.1549
Non SD 9773 1.7496 1.524 1.2918 0.485 0.3644
pensioner N 77 87 87 87 87 71
Post Mean 10040 2.2414 3.092 2.454 0.7701 0.1515
SD 12232 1.7585 1.4835 1.3001 0.4232 0.3613
N 76 87 87 87 87 66
60-64 Pre Mean 4086.2 1.9542 2.8667 2.2074 0.7111 0.1579
Bottom SD 5306.5 1.1493 1.5052 0.9932 0.4549 0.3666
60% N 130 131 135 135 135 95
Post Mean 4233.9 1.8074 2.8519 2.2052 0.7333 0.129
SD 4653.8 1.0037 1.5235 0.9911 0.4439 0.3371
N 135 135 135 135 135 93
60-64 Pre Mean 22743 2.2195 2.9268 2.6098 0.6341 0.1429
Top 60% SD 51839 1.3325 1.1487 1.2625 0.4877 0.355
N 40 41 41 41 41 35
Post Mean 21984 2.1463 2.8293 2.6317 0.6098 0.1765
SD 13286 1.3521 1.243 1.3058 0.4939 0.387
N 36 41 41 41 41 34
Table 6. Summary statistics for the single elderly aged 60+ by pen-
sion receipt status and time, All money values are in 2008 KRW (in
thousand). Source: Author’s calculation using a sample of the elderly aged 60
and above from the Korean Retirement and Income Study.
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Age and Time Stats Income Household No. of Education Health Caregiving
Pension size children Problem
70+ Pre Mean 6768 2.6857 4.3534 2.5071 0.8604 0.0991
Pensioner SD 14929 1.2307 1.6082 1.1579 0.3469 0.2992
N 546 560 566 566 566 484
Post Mean 4501.9 2.6431 4.2792 2.5231 0.8817 0.0654
SD 5153.4 1.209 1.5707 1.1837 0.3233 0.2474
N 431 566 566 566 566 566
70+ Pre Mean 14787 2.5846 3.8901 3.4506 0.8461 0.0544
Non SD 13106 1.1749 1.3649 1.3334 0.3614 0.2273
pensioner N 255 272 273 273 273 239
Post Mean 17074 2.5385 3.8718 3.4938 0.8718 0.037
SD 28796 1.1534 1.3236 1.3691 0.3349 0.1882
N 251 273 273 273 273 273
65-69 Pre Mean 10502 2.7955 3.4015 2.6894 0.8258 0.1839
Pensioner SD 8723.1 1.1252 1.3586 1.1005 0.3800 0.3882
N 253 264 264 264 264 223
Post Mean 8456.7 2.6705 3.4129 2.6989 0.8447 0.1212
SD 8283.5 1.1241 1.3453 1.1084 0.3629 0.3270
N 192 264 264 263 264 264
65-69 Pre Mean 21631 2.8317 3.151 3.3993 0.7819 0.1573
Non SD 19037 1.0488 1.1462 1.1393 0.4137 0.3648
pensioner N 271 297 298 298 298 248
Post Mean 20920 2.6644 3.1275 3.4238 0.7987 0.0940
SD 18453 1.0058 1.1593 1.175 0.4017 0.2923
N 266 298 298 298 298 298
60-64 Pre Mean 18626 3.096 2.7607 3.0853 0.7017 0.1827
Bottom SD 12259 1.0506 1.0348 1.0127 0.4582 0.3874
60% N 289 302 305 305 305 197
Post Mean 16976 2.8754 2.7541 3.1089 0.7442 0.1279
SD 9013.5 0.9955 1.0364 1.0275 0.4370 0.3345
N 301 305 305 305 305 305
60-64 Pre Mean 44367 3.1429 2.7313 3.791 0.6267 0.12
Top 60% SD 33869 1.0161 1.0561 1.1508 0.4854 0.3272
N 123 133 134 134 134 75
Post Mean 54028 2.8284 2.7164 3.8098 0.6567 0.0896
SD 32534 0.9055 1.0663 1.1763 0.4766 0.2866
N 90 134 134 133 134 134
Table 7. Summary statistics for elderly couples aged 60+ by pension
receipt status and time, Couple pensioner means that at least one spouse
receives pension. All money values are in 2008 KRW (in thousand). Source:
Author’s calculation using a sample of the elderly aged 60 and above from the
Korean Retirement and Income Study.
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I explore various regression models. First, I simply compare the changes in
private transfers between pensioners (treatment group) and non-pensioners (con-
trol group). Second, for a more robust analysis, I take more restricted treatment
and control groups for DID analysis. In the previous model the control group of
non-pensioners includes both the poor elderly aged 60-64 and the rich elderly aged
65 and above. This income difference between the members of the countrol group
(all non-pensioners) may contaminate the estimates. Aside from the pension re-
ceipt status, there should be no difference in the trend of private transfers between
treatment and control groups. People just above or below the 65 threshold may
have little difference if they belong to the same income group. I consider pensioners
aged 65-69 as a treatment group and individuals 60-64 years old at the bottom 60%
of income distribution as a control group. Regarding couples, the control group in-
cludes couples with at least one spouse aged 60-65 at the bottom 60% of income
distribution.
Table 8 and 9 report DID regression estimates for single individuals and couples
respectively. For regression models (1) and (2), the dependent variable is private
transfers from children, and for models (3) and (4), the dependent variable is net
private transfers. For models (1) and (3), the treatment group is simply pension-
ers; the control group is non-pensioners aged 60 and above. For models (2) and
(4), the treatment group includes pensioners aged 65-69; the control group includes
elderly 60-64 years old at the bottom 60% of income distribution. Post is a dummy
variable indicating the period before or after the pension and Pensioner is also a
dummy variable indicating pension receipt status. The interpretation of coefficients
is as follows: the coefficient of Post is the mean change before and after the pen-
sion for the control group; the coefficient of Pensioner is the difference in private
transfers between the treatment group and the control group before the pension;
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and finally the coefficient of interest is for the interaction between the Post and
Pension dummy, which is interpreted as the effect of the pension relative to the
control group.
In all the models of Table 8, the coefficient of Post*Pensioner is large and sta-
tistically significant. Being a pensioner leads to 334,000 KRW more in private
transfers from children in model (1) and 163,000 KRW more in net private trans-
fers in model (3) relative to non-pensioners aged 60 and above after the pension
compared to before. Since the pension amount is 996,000 KRW on average, pen-
sioners receive 0.3 more per KRW in private transfers (model 1) and 0.16 more per
KRW in net transfers (model 3). There is no evidence of crowding out in this case.
The positive effect of the pension is even higher in models (2) and (4) in which the
treatment and the control groups are pensioners aged 65-69 and individuals 60-64
years old at the bottom 60% of income distribution. Coresidence may be nega-
tively correlated with private transfers because living together with children itself
includes in-kind supports. The coefficient on coresidence is negative and significant
when the control group is a low income group aged 60-64 as expected, but not
significant when the control group is all non-pensioners. Women tend to live longer
and are more dependent on their children’s support. The coefficient of female is
large and significant in models (1) and (3), but not in (2) and (4). Caregiving for
grandchildren is not significant. In the survey, few elderly reported that they pro-
vide caregiving activity. In Table 5 the fraction of the single elderly providing care
for their grandchildren is less for pensioners than non-pensioners. Other control
variables have expected sign: parents with health problem receive more transfers;
the more children the higher the transfers.
The results for couples in Table 9 are different from the single elderly. Pensioner
couples receive 74,000 KRW more in transfers from their children relative to non-
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var Transfers from Children Net transfers from children
Control group Non-pensioner Bottom 60% Non-pensioner Bottom 60%
60+ 60-64 60+ 60-64
Post -983.40*** -1227.68*** -701.78*** -1195.89***
(11.37) (21.25) (13.18) (23.94)
Pensioner -427.28*** -932.17*** -142.79 -1025.29***
(130.54) (126.92) (101.34) (102.45)
Post*Pensioner 334.63*** 572.53*** 162.91* 633.77***
(80.43) (105.75) (84.20) (109.89)
Income -0.01*** -0.03 -0.02*** -0.04
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03)
Coreside -231.17 -421.90*** -80.67 -356.34**
(226.33) (122.69) (296.03) (148.03)
Caregiving for -34.47 267.46 118.91 230.03
grandchildren (569.59) (440.64) (445.27) (402.72)
Female 954.71** 918.49 839.86** 895.86
(439.23) (596.93) (402.87) (621.71)
Health problem 344.52*** 411.58*** 321.83** 446.94***
(94.59) (71.73) (149.44) (90.39)
No. of children 282.09*** 291.00*** 259.39** 272.56**
(93.95) (106.16) (107.65) (117.34)
Household size -201.79*** -196.42*** -243.60*** -206.71***
(21.45) (50.84) (19.13) (53.63)
Education 566.56*** 621.08*** 511.20*** 593.18***
(84.47) (68.96) (101.16) (69.15)
Constant 556.74*** 1013.28*** 381.77*** 1012.14***
(79.33) (268.55) (124.85) (321.08)
Observations 1907 1491 1905 1490
Table 8. DID regression results for the single elderly All money values
are in 2008 KRW (in thousand). Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < .10, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var Transfers from Children Net transfers from children
Control group Non-pensioner Bottom 60% Non-pensioner Bottom 60%
60+ 60-64 60+ 60-64
Post -111.87*** -278.28*** 186.87*** 113.22**
(32.84) (56.42) (39.67) (46.46)
Pensioner 504.64** 145.30 697.51** 603.81*
(203.62) (275.41) (311.85) (359.02)
Post*Pensioner 74.06*** 220.59*** -186.58*** -125.71*
(15.20) (15.60) (62.79) (67.02)
Income -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Coreside 37.87 286.69 144.39 366.83
(406.77) (384.31) (449.87) (504.68)
Caregiving for 611.66* 304.51 846.96* 356.15*
grandchildren (328.34) (209.20) (459.91) (186.44)
Health Problem 402.83*** 419.02*** 480.38*** 457.02***
(83.09) (121.36) (13.08) (52.18)
No. of children 396.93*** 459.54*** 321.45*** 351.06***
(45.76) (152.96) (59.84) (124.35)
Household size 41.91 -128.80* -39.35 -175.30**
(177.12) (68.16) (149.87) (68.58)
Education 588.98*** 755.55*** 476.94* 786.14***
(179.99) (91.06) (250.73) (56.73)
Constant -723.81*** -596.08 -445.65 -894.05
(113.49) (480.82) (302.20) (597.71)
Observations 2897 1782 2893 1778
Table 9. DID regression results for elderly couples All money values are
in 2008 KRW (in thousand). Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < .10, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01
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pensioners (model 1), but they receive 186,000 KRW less in net transfers (model 3).
Similar results apply to the restricted treatment and control groups (model 2 and
4). Since couples’ average pension amount is 1,620,000 KRW, our estimate of the
per KRW crowding out effect is -0.11 in net private transfers (model 3). The effects
of observable characteristics are similar to those of the single elderly. Household
size and coresidence are statistically more significant for the single elderly than for
elderly couples.
Crowding out occurs for couple pensioners but not for single pensioners. What
does this result tell us? As Tables 3-5 show, single pension recipients, on aver-
age, are considerably poorer and more dependent on private transfers than couple
pensioners. This reflects the female elderly population being much larger than the
male. The result can be explained by people becoming more generous when they
are the only one to help someone in need compared to the case when there are
others who can help. If your mother were alone, you would be more likely to help
her out than you would if your father were still alive. The altruism literature ig-
nores the fact that many generous acts cannot be explained by the additive form of
other regarding preferences model. The standard altruism model predicts greater
crowding out of private transfers for single pensioners than for couple pensioners
as a result of public pensions. In fact, the results show the opposite, supporting
other hypotheses such as filial norms and demonstration effects.
3.6 Conclusion
This exploration of the possible crowding out effect of the Basic Old Age Pension
in Korea employed the Difference in Difference (DID) method. The DID estimates
show mixed results: crowding out did not take place for the single elderly, while for
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elderly couples an additional unit of pension income was offset by a 0.11 reduction
in net private transfers from adult children. These results should be interpreted
with caution due to several limitations of the analysis. It encompasses only two
relatively recent periods, and lack of longer period data makes it difficult to accu-
rately measure possible time trend effects. Further, the Basic Old Age Pension is
not strictly a randomized experiment because being eligible for the pension is not
random; the treatment group and control group are systemically different regard-
ing their income. However, private transfers do not affect pension eligibility; thus,
reverse causality is less likely to work.
Still, the results offer important insights into the impact of public pension trans-
fers on private transfers. A considerable proportion of the elderly population, es-
pecially women without a spouse, do not experience the crowding out effect, and
among those who do, the size of the effect is relatively small. The results demon-
strate a redistribution effect of the Basic Old Age Pension targeting the poor elderly
in Korea.
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